Archive for April, 2009

Justifying the Madness

Tuesday, April 28th, 2009

Having stumbled into a rut of playing online all the time recently I ventured along to a nearby pub’s regular game yesterday just to get some face-to-face action back into my system. There’s not much call for a ‘game face’ in cyber world and I didn’t want to get too rusty. This was my first time in the cheap weekly pub tournament that, unsurprisingly, brings in a hardcore of regular players and a spattering of generally inexperienced newcomers. I was more than happy for several of the regulars to assume I was inexperienced just because they hadn’t seen my face before. Even better, after one particularly outrageous pot win I was dismissed as incompetent as well as a novice. Such is the power of table image that one or two players were still disbelieving when I was heads-up for the tournament several hours later.

The incident that would define my reputation for the evening occurred after half an hour of highly uneventful poker where I did very little other than establish what the blind structure was and fold a lot. The format offered an initial buy-in of 1500 chips, with an option of 2000 for a minimal additional fee. There would then be a free reload of 1500 chips for anybody busting out in the first hour, or as an add-on for everybody else. With the blinds guaranteed to soar later on and only 3 places paying out of 21 starters I realised that early chip accumulation was vital to compete. With that I mind I made my move.

The table play had been generally passive with ABC poker the order of the day. I soon felt that anybody getting out of line by becoming more aggressive and playing a wider range was liable to take a few pots cheaply or at least get themselves noticed. When I raised up behind a timid limper with 9-2o from a late seat I thought it might liven things up. This would prove to be an understatement. My raise was followed by a short-stack moving all-in and two further players, including the initial limper calling her bet. Suddenly the play was back on me with 2600 already in the pot and a further 450 chips required to see a guaranteed flop. I quickly checked my cards and still saw the miserable 9-2o staring back at me but felt that I now had value to call to see the ensuing board of 7-9-J. The three players in front of me all checked. I was last to act and had little hesitation in pushing my remaining 1100 chips into the middle. I had hit second pair, with an admittedly terrible kicker, but as flops went for this hand it looked reasonable. There was some chance I was actually ahead and I was likely to have a few outs if not. With such a big pot built up already I was fully, and unashamedly, committed to my trash hand. To my initial disappointment I was quickly called by J-10 before the other player with extra chips folded. The all-in hand held the equally scary Q-10. Moments later I spiked another 9 on the turn and the river drew a blank to rake in 5250 chips with a badbeat to the resounding horror of my rivals.

Now I was very lucky to win. That much can’t be denied. But interestingly for me most of the players at the table simply couldn’t fathom how this awful thing could have happened. I mean surely everybody knows –even an incompetent newcomer – that 9-2o is a bad hand that must be folded! For my part I made sure I looked suitably embarrassed and muttered something about ‘not knowing what I was doing.’ Defending myself by citing my poker CV would have been crass and foolish as it could have destroyed a table image that a half-decent player can only dream of. I had to keep up the hustle.

Firstly, you’ll be relieved to know that I am aware that 9-2o is a poor starting hand. I entered the pot in the interests of play variation with the key considerations that there was no obvious strength in the one hand limped behind me and that I held position. Furthermore, I felt the table was tight enough that I was quite likely to win the pot with a continuation bet on any flop. Crucially, once that initial gamble had been taken I believe my hand broadly ‘played itself’ in a way that thoughtful players should appreciate.

When the play returned to me pre-flop I had to call 450 chips to make it a pot of 3050. From a purely mathematical point-of-view this decision could be justified. Although the table had been quite meek by the standards of a cheap rebuy tournament I had no reason to assume that all three players had top premium hands. If I was up against three hands such as AK, AQ and 6-6 then I would have a 16% chance of winning with 2-9o. The pot odds afforded to me meant that I needed about a 15% chance of victory or better to make it a sound call. Even if I was up against better hands that took me below that 15% threshold I could probably argue my case for calling based on implied odds. Namely, had I made a miracle flop of two pair or better then it’s highly likely that I would have won considerably more from players who were bound to commit the rest of their stacks with strong holdings on a massive pot. Of course at the time I couldn’t know exactly what everybody else had, but in the event I was confronted in the showdown with nothing more than J-10 and Q-10, providing further vindication. Pre-flop, against those two hands alone, I would have had a 24% of winning.

I remain convinced that after the flop (J-9-7) my only move was all-in after the play was checked to me. Of course I wasn’t so naïve that I thought that checking equated to certain weakness but pushing 1100 chips into the 3050 chips already there made sense. If I was called by one opponent then I stood to win the pot of 5250 if successful. I could win this play one time in every five and it would still be a profitable move. As it happens I was in worse shape than I expected after being checked to. After hitting the flop I actually only had a 15% chance of winning against J-10 and Q-10. But I couldn’t have known that and I would argue that the mistake on the flop came from the opponent holding J-10 who flopped very well but didn’t bet, thus increasing the chance of an outdraw. This point is proven by the fact that had I checked the flop he would have lost anyway after the rogue 9 came on the turn.

My final defence would be that it was a rebuy tournament. I made my play knowing that I had more chips in reserve if things went wrong. That makes a big difference to tournament strategy. It can help justify calculated risks that when combined with good fortune can make you look like a lunatic.

6-Seat Dilemmas-Part 2

Thursday, April 16th, 2009

I ended Part 1 of my look at 6-seat SNGs by suggesting that it becomes as easy to fold the best hand on the bubble as it is to end up all-in with trash. To explain how this can even be a problem for good, experienced players you need only think of what you would do with a few specific hands when down to the final three. Let’s assume again that the blinds are 150/300 but this time you have 2200 chips and wake up on the button with A-2o. Your opponents both have about 3400 chips so you are short-stacked but certainly not crippled.

What do I do with a rag ace?

With you holding an ace the chances of an opponent holding another ace, most likely with a better kicker, is only about 1 in 5. The chances of an opponent holding a pocket pair is about 1 in 17 so there is good reason to hope that your hand is winning pre-flop. With this in mind you might push all-in but if you do receive a call then you know immediately that you are in big trouble against a typical player’s range. Perhaps the best call you can hope for is from a hand like KQo, which is tough to fold on the big blind, short-handed, and against which you would be a 57% favourite.

But hang on, this doesn’t sound that good. Your best case scenario if you get called sees you still only a marginal favourite and most of time a call will find you to be an underdog. Basically you’re desperate to force two folds and take the blinds and have very little reason to be confident about a showdown. Well that’s more or less what you would be thinking if you held 7-2o as well! This can make you think one of two ways depending on whether you are a ‘glass half-full’ or ‘glass half-empty’ type of player. An optimistic, aggressive player might conclude that the chances of either opponent having a hand to genuinely fear is slim enough that he might as well push all-in with a wide range of start cards – almost anything. With this mentality it becomes easy to comprehend how a player suddenly finds his tournament future on the line with trash. When that happens a few times in a row it’s not uncommon for the aggressor to rein in his rash tendencies and determine to never go out with a bad hand again. Suddenly the chastened bubble player goes into his shell and folds A-2o on the button because he would be annoyed to go out without a genuinely big hand. The fact that it may well in fact be the best hand at this point is just an annoyance. This is the ultimate tournament dilemma and it has no easy answers. But there is, of course, another play option that I haven’t mentioned today, and it is a crucial one.

So can I still get away with raising and how much?

As I alluded to in Part 1 this is another delicate option because of the general air of suspicion that surrounds most tournament tables. A raise when the blinds are worth winning will always carry the whiff of stealing with it and this must be factored in. Suddenly, the chip stack sizes and the tendencies of your rivals are far more important in determining tactics than the cards themselves. This is the essence of competitive poker; to play the opponent and the situation, not just the cards.

With some players I know that if I raise the minimum amount on the bubble of a 6-seat tournament they will always call in the big blind and they have good odds to do so. I also know that if I raise 3-times the big blind with such a shallow stack then I’m probably committing to the pot, whether I like to or not. In the example above it is very hard to justify raising 900 chips out of my 2200 only to give up to a re-raise, or without betting a flop. I can’t waste 41% of my chips like that and end up with 1300 chips. However, if I had just a few more chips then I would consider a steal raise and it would be in-between the minimum and the ‘standard’ in size.

Does raising 2.5 times the big blind really help?

I genuinely believe that the ‘2.5 raise’ eg 750 when the blinds are 150/300 is a secret weapon that isn’t utilised effectively by many SNG players. As with so many good tactics, if you find it is difficult to play against then it’s probably something to consider adding to your own playbook. As crazy as it may sound many players will become reticent about calling on their big blind for a further 450 chips when seemingly they wouldn’t think twice about it for 300. Therefore, that can mean more pots won uncontested. Secondly, the ‘2.5 raise’ looks like a carefully sized bet that you might throw in with a premium hand, thus causing trepidation. Conversely, when it becomes clear that the ‘2.5’ has become your standard raise it will provide excellent disguise when you do pick up a monster. This can work spectacularly well against an opponent who gets frustrated by calling and then folding the flop who instead attempts to put you in your place pre-flop with a re-raise all-in bluff.

Admittedly raise sizing is about personal preference and many good players would play down the significance I have given to ‘2.5 betting’. But in small SNGs fine margins can make huge differences in the long term. For example, thousands of games of experience suggest to me that the difference between having 1300 chips when the blinds are 150/300 or having 1850 is significant. Therefore, raising 900 chips to steal from an initial 2200 feels like a mistake and yet raising 750 chips from a stack of 2600 feels acceptable. There’s a telling difference to me between risking 29% of my chips on a bubble steal in the latter case as opposed to 41% in the former. Once you take away the maths, it’s a game of opinions.

6-Seat Dilemmas-Part 1

Tuesday, April 7th, 2009

In a six-seated single-table tournament it is commonplace for only two places to pay out. Technically, the odds of making the money are favourable in comparison to the standard 10-seat format where the top three take a prize. In the six-seater, 33% of the starting field will make money as opposed to 30% in the full table version. Yet many SNG regulars still shy away from the table of six where play inevitably gets short-handed much sooner and the need for aggression is paramount. When fortune is running against you making the top two seems a tough ask even with fewer runners to overcome. A typical scenario I face on a near-daily basis is to find myself one of three finely balanced remaining stacks with about 3000 chips each and the blinds at 150/300. This is the time when you must hold your own to survive and accumulate chips to prosper. Although every game has its own unique dynamic, the same old questions and dilemmas will keep arising and there’s no excuse for not being ready with a few answers.

 

If I don’t get any good cards at this crucial phase of the game what can I do?

 

Steal. It’s imperative. When the blinds are eating away at your stack on two out of every three hands becoming tight and weak is disastrous. If you wait too long to make that move even an eventual double-up may not put you back in a strong position. Your problems will be compounded by the fact that observant, aggressive opponents will identify weakness and target you for their own stealing. A timid strategy may get you a decent number of second places after the other two players clash but this is no good to you. The pay structure is always skewed dramatically in favour of the winner so a series of 2nds and 3rds is futile in the pursuit of decent long-term profit.

 

If I do get a big hand, how do I get paid off?

 

Note that if you’ve been a folding machine for any length of time then a sudden raise is likely to be respected. This sounds great (we all want respect) but, of course, it is not. You get a big hand – at last – you raise, they fold. That’s hopeless. And the problem isn’t really the raise. A flat call from the button seat, and possibly the small blind, may also put your opponents on high alert. After showing weakness you really need to get very lucky and not only pick up a big hand but ideally while sitting in the big blind. At least there you are last to act pre-flop and you may be targeted by aggressive opponents. But this is a lot to ask; not only to get a strong hand at the right moment but also in the one seat that favours your table image. A much better bet is to be stealing pots and playing quite loose aggressively as soon as the blinds are significant and the play is short-handed. That way the really big hand is much harder to spot and you might get the action you crave.

 

How hard should I defend my big blind?

 

Once again table image and a strong read on your opponents is crucial. If you are being raised at every opportunity from either the button or the small blind then you must make a stand at some point. If your opponents are pushing all-in with what you perceive as a very wide range then you have to adjust your calling range accordingly. A hand such as A-4 can be very strong against all-out aggression; a player who believes that fold equity makes pushing any two cards a gamble worth taking.

Against a barrage of constant raising (but not all-ins) the big blind considerations are slightly different. In this case the all-in re-raise may often claim the pot without need for a showdown. That’s rarely anything but a great result in short-handed bubble play. Not only do you win a decent pot without the threat of elimination that comes when your cards are on their back, but your table image is enhanced as an aggressor. Another alternative is peeling off the flop.

 

Can I outplay my opponents off the flop and how many flops will they let me see?

 

At least when you get raised a small or standard amount on your big blind there is normally an opportunity to see three more cards. Some players will have competent pre-flop pushing and calling ranges but go to pieces when the flop comes into play. They know enough to identify a good start hand but may lack the requisite finesse when the board makes things more complicated. You want to take these players out of their comfort zone. A check raise all-in when you hit the flop well can be a valuable tool from the big blind. The same play can be equally potent when you’re convinced your opponent has missed the board and almost certainly can’t call the all-in. A classic example of this is the loose aggressor who fires hard at a board like A-A-9 when all previous evidence suggests that he only checks the flops he likes the most. Good players should want to see a decent number of flops when play is short-handed. The problem with that is that many opponents simply won’t allow it. Any limp from the button or small blind results in an immediate shove all-in. Inevitably this in turn opens the door for trapping with big hands.

 

So there is still much more to consider regarding short-handed play. Next week I’ll look at the dichotomy that exists where it becomes as easy to fold the best pre-flop hand as it is to risk everything with the worst.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker