Archive for July, 2009

The Float

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

One of the most advanced bluff moves in poker appears to be one of the most straightforward to execute. In essence, the float move involves calling an opponent on the flop when weak with the intention of claiming the pot on the turn or river with the implication of strength. Easy then. Well no, not really, because as always timing and the right set of circumstances are required to make the move successful and to avoid looking foolish.

Much of the criteria needed for the play to be profitable should be easy to remember. Firstly, it is best to attempt the float against one opponent only. To challenge the strength of multiple opponents in this way is high risk or folly for the obvious reason that there is much greater likelihood that a genuinely strong hand is out there. Secondly, position is key. If your opponent has raised the pot pre-flop and fired a continuation bet thereafter there is every chance he has missed the board. The ‘c-bet’ is generally successful because it assumes that others will fold if they miss. The float is a direct challenge to this assumption and has the capability of destroying the potency of the ‘c-bet’. In essence we are talking about head-to-head power play each time taken to its next dimension. The pre-flop raise without great strength is merely phase one, the ‘c-bet’ on a miss is phase two and the float play (a call with nothing) introduces phase three.

As with all aspects of bluffing a good read is everything. Floating an opponent who rarely plays a non-premium hand is likely to be foolish in the extreme. However, a frequent pre-flop raiser who is aggressively pushing a wide range of cards could be ripe for the picking. Logically, somebody who plays any two high cards or any suited connectors but always fires a bet at the flop must be betting with air a high percentage of the time. It is therefore too weak to give up the ghost everything you suspect that you both missed. But for the play to succeed you need to know whether the loose aggressor will read your call as strength and give up on the turn. If he will relentlessly fire again on the turn and river with nothing then floating is not the play to challenge him with. Rest assured that these characters will instead pay you off handsomely when you finally do pick up a big hand.

But rest assured there are a huge number of players who do see the benefit of hammering the play pre-flop and on the flop but then do slowdown from then on against apparent strength. The float is therefore most likely to work against aware opponents. A maniac who is oblivious to what’s going on around him may be the wrong target for this subtle manoeuvre. Over time it should be possible to determine who is scared of an ominous flat call. Funnily enough, it will often be the better players who are aware, and therefore ‘float candidates’. But this realisation requires further caution because the best players of all maybe able to spot a float when they see one as well. Nothing is ever straight forward in this game!

So far we have viewed the float entirely as a bluff move with scant regard to the cards actually in one’s own hand. But let’s consider a partial float play that isn’t really a bluff so much as a biding of time, displaying some strength and allowing an opportunity to gain further information on the turn. Let’s consider that I have position but have only called a loose aggressive pre-flop raiser with A-Q. Firstly, why didn’t I re-raise!?! No matter. Given that I only called, how should I then react to a rainbow board of 10-7-2? The loose aggressive opponent inevitably ‘c-bets’ and so the decision passes back to me. I regret to say that on too many occasions in the past my natural inclination would have been simply to fold and wait for a better spot where I actually do connect with the board. But hang on; there must be a pretty strong chance that I’m still winning here against much of my opponent’s range. I could consider a re-raise to see if this can take the pot but in many formats this will be risking quite a high percentage of my chips with ace high. I’m not saying this isn’t an option but flat calling may be the best of all three alternatives in this spot. The most crucial aspect of my decision making here is how I perceive my play will be interpreted. Experience tells me that a re-raise will look more suspicious than a call here due to the barren nature of the flop. If I was really strong then why would I want to risk scaring off my rival with a re-raise when there appear to be so few scare cards out there? Had I flopped a set then I would almost certainly be flat calling the ‘c-bet’ so that’s what I will do now. Implied strength.

Having partially executed the float, the turn card now becomes pivotal. There is every chance that the loose aggressor will shutdown if he still hasn’t hit at this point. If he fires convincingly again then I may have to admit defeat but with the consolation that a re-raise on the flop would have cost me even more chips. But there are still two further possibilities, both of which could work in my favour. Firstly, I could spike an ace or jack either of which would be top pair and hard to read having called a flop with nothing. A further possibility is that a card comes along that I can ‘represent’. A second 7 for example could be represented by a re-raise that suggests I called the flop with second pair and then got lucky. Of course, this could be read as a bluff but with the right table image and against the right opponent it could be a great play. It just goes to show that a well timed float can open up a world of possibilities.

Milking the Bully

Thursday, July 2nd, 2009

Sitting with a paltry number of chips when a big stack bully is running over the play can be an intimidating and frustrating experience. With a chip stack at least three times bigger than anybody else, and twelve times more than many at the table, the bully is in an enviable position. He has power. The power that comes from knowing that anybody who tangles with him will be jeopardising their future in the tournament. The bully will always have less equity invested at any one time, allowing him the freedom, and providing the confidence, to raise every hand with scant regard to hand selection. At the bubble phase of a big multi-table tournament this can cause nervous opponents to freeze and throw away cards that could easily ‘double them up’. The fear factor will quite possibly help them squeeze into the lowly money places but it will also deny them a rare shot at one of the big prizes.

A $55 rebuy tournament I was in last night demonstrated why people get scared of the big stacks, how unfair the game can be, but also how a small stack can be revived single-handedly by the aggressive tactics of a chip leader.

The first significant incident I will describe may make you question (yet again) why we all bother with poker in the first place. Sometimes you do everything right for the cruellest of outcomes. The third largest stack at the table, with the unenviable position of sitting to the immediate right of ’the chippie’ opened the pot with a standard raise; his first raise in some while. The chip leader next door immediately called and everybody else folded with great haste. One would not have to be an acute observer of the game to assess that quiet, solid Player A, under no pressure to take chances, probably had the better start cards than bullying aggressive Player B. This assumption proved correct as Q(s)-Q(d) took on K(h)-9(h) Fireworks were therefore assured when the flop delivered Q(h)-10(d)-3(h). Player A bet out firmly on the flop, no doubt realising that despite holding ‘the nuts’ of top set, he was still vulnerable to drawing hands. Player B, no stranger to raising with nothing to apply pressure, now had a flush and gutshot draw to make that very move with. His raise was inevitably, and correctly, followed by a re-raise all-in and a call that signalled a dramatic showdown and a massive pot. The joy Player A felt on the flop would have diminished sharply when revealed how many outs Player B still had, indeed still a 32% chance of victory. The A(h) on the turn was a killer blow that handed the chip leader a flush that would not be conquered by a full house on the river. In an instance Player A was out of the tournament in 53rd position (50 places paid) with a great hand and a sob story to boot.

The next eye-catching moment involving the big stack had a rather different outcome, though only just. This time the bully raised with 4-8o and got immediately shoved by a shortish, but not desperate stack with AQ. The big stack correctly called the all-in re-raise with his trash hand as he was getting odds of better than 2:1. It’s always worth remembering that even 2-7o has a 32% chance of toppling AK in a showdown. I’m not convinced that Mr AQ had calculated these odds and the likelihood of a showdown with only 51 competitors remaining. Maybe he was just brave enough to risk being the last person out before ‘the money’ but I’m not so sure. I suspect from the speed of the move that he thought some fold equity remained and that he might win the pot uncontested. From my point of view I would rather make that play, in his position, with a high pocket pair only. AQ was very likely to be ahead but at the same time very vulnerable. Had the big stack turned over 6-7s for example then AQ becomes a mere 59% favourite to win. As it was Mr AQ would have been delighted to see 4-8o for the split second before the flop revealed 4-4-10. I was anticipating a tirade of colourful language before the miracle ‘runner-runner’ of King and Jack on the turn and river made a straight for AQ and saved the day.
For my own part I hung around in the tournament as a short stack simply by picking my moments against the wild, loose aggressor. Mediocre holdings such as A8 and Q10, the best I was seeing, had decent showdown value against a man playing any two cards. Then having crawled into the money positions my chance to compete for the big prizes was cruelly extinguished when a desperate late seat lunge of Q-6 toppled my awaiting A-K on the button. As always, going out on a bad beat is cruel, but in reality the alternatives are no better. Us poker players just don’t like losing!

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker