the-poker-grafter

On my way to a minor cash in a $1million tournament last
weekend I had a couple of reminders that you should never
under-estimate your opponent’s ability to adapt and mix up
their play. Well, there was one major reminder to me that
I shouldn’t pigeon-hole my rivals and hopefully a lesson
for somebody else that I can’t be so easily read!
The first incident occurred about three hours into the
deep stack event when I was ticking along comfortably
while the play at the table was generally quite frisky. In
fact I had come to the conclusion that only one player at
the table was a real rock. Everybody else seemed keen to
play at least the odd marginal hand where as the chap to
my immediate right seemed tight and I assumed weak. He
literally didn’t play a hand for the first two hours after
joining the table. Delighted to have such a timid
character to contest the blinds with, I was confident I
could bully him on a very rare occasion when everybody
else folded to him and he elected to call the small
blind. I quickly fired a raise from the big blind with 5-
2o assuming I could quickly take down the pot with the
minimum of fuss. Somewhat surprised that he called the
raise I was confronted by a rainbow flop of A-Q-6. I
paused momentarily before firing a standard bet of about
60% of the size of the pot. My rival flat called quite
quickly at which point the game was up with 5-2o and I’d
have to shut it down.

I have been generally pushing myself to fire more often on
the turn and river because of the dangers of ‘float
callers’ I have discussed before. However, there has to
be a limit to this heightened aggression and if ever that
limit had been reached it was surely now. I mean I was
holding 5-2 against a perceived rock who had flat-called a
flop with three over cards. The situation could surely not
have appeared more forlorn! The turn and river failed to
offer even the faintest prospect of showdown value from a
small pocket pair and I resisted the temptation to fire
again on the river as I couldn’t imagine it would ever
look convincing and was thus a bluff destined to fail. I
had hoped he would bet at some stage so I could at least
muck my hand to avoid showing the trash I had made a move
with, but alas he did not and was able to see my feeble
holdings.
But what was this? He turned over J-6o! This was fairly
extraordinary. There had been nothing to suggest that he
could defend the small blind with such mediocrity pre-flop
let alone call with bottom pair when the first community
cards came as well. I immediately realised that I had been
out-thought by my adversary who was seemingly more aware
of his weak table image than anybody, and was therefore
determined to make a stand no matter what. My irritation
at being outplayed was only extended by the realisation
that a further strong bluff bet on the turn would have
almost certainly ended the pot in my favour. He had called
desperately hoping I was making a move and was indeed
floating me. But regardless of his read and his
determination to stand up for himself there’s just no way
that he could have called a further bet with fourth pair
and a re-raise all-in was quite possibly, surely, beyond
him.

But as frustrating as it was I ultimately wasn’t going to
be too hard on myself. Taking on a rock in position is
generally smart and very few people can suddenly transform
so dramatically. He just played a blinder. A little later
though I gained some redemption with a move made at the
right time that won me a lovely big pot with queen-high..
On this occasion I opened up the betting with a mid-seat
raise holding Q-9o. Incidentally, I don’t just play bad
hands, even if this is the way it seems! These were just
two isolated incidents, and everybody loves a little play
variation. Anyway, I got a call from the player on the
button only who was seeing a fair number of flops against
everybody. Despite my earlier faux pas my table image was
I felt probably pretty sound at this point as I’d stayed
in line for most of the previous two hours and shown a few
big cards. This time however I was scraping the barrel
with Q-9 on another rainbow board of 10-7-2. Again the c-
bet failed to take down the pot and the turn brought
another 7. I paused, then checked and waited to see what
my opponent did. He hesitantly bet about half the pot at
which point I suddenly spotted an opportunity. I got the
distinct impression that he didn’t like that second 7 all
that much although he could easily have had a 10. When
contemplating his range it felt quite likely that he held
something like Q-10 or K-10 and I felt he could be taken
off such a hand. The other possibilities after the flop
call included a set, that would now have become a full
house or even quads, but the speculative bet on the turn
made this seem unlikely. A monster hand like that would
surely encourage a check with the hope of encouraging me
on the river when his hand was already made. I therefore
concluded that a check-raise of 4500 chips on top of his
1500 bet was likely to get through.

Our relevant chip stacks was a crucial factor in this
decision. I had begun the hand with several thousand more
and was therefore able to risk the bluff move knowing that
if it failed I would still have a playable, though heavily
depleted stack. My rival in contrast knew that a re-raise
committed the rest of his stack and that even a flat call
was likely to see him all-in on the river. He therefore
had to be very sure I was bluffing to confidently commit
everything with a hand like K-10 or anything less. He soon
folded; as suspicious as my flop continuation bet may have
looked, the check-raise on the turn had to look much
stronger. That it came after a second 7 made a hand like
A-7 very plausible for me. The audacity of committing so
many chips to the bluff by check-raising rather than
simply firing again was what ultimately made it a good
play. Of course, I might not be looking back quite so
fondly and proudly had I got my read wrong and lost a
massive pot with queen high! But such are the fine margins
of poker where the gap between bravery and stupidity is
never too wide.

When you don’t know a thing about your opponent I think it is always best to assume a reasonable level of competence on their part. Better to wait for mistakes to undermine that status rather than under-estimating an unknown quantity. It’s the best way to keep your own play up to scratch. Assuming everybody else is rubbish seems to me a fast track to losing money and the sort of wishful thinking that could find yourself disregarded by others. ‘I put you on ace-king,’ is the sort of fanciful statement that fish come out with to justify calling off all their chips with bottom pair on a low flop. Don’t get me wrong; there are times when I too ‘put a player on ace-king’ having watched them play for a while, but why would I do so on the first significant play of theirs I have ever seen? The simple answer is wishful thinking. A bad player who hates to fold any flop that they have connected with in some way tries to find a hand that their opponent could hold to justify a dubious call of their own. Ace-king often fits the bill.

The other side of the coin is that I will sometimes fold the best hand having given my opponent credit where it is not due. This is a wretched feeling and of course feels like a mistake but it won’t necessarily be so. Sometimes you can only justify making a call against the loosest, wildest player at the table. But you have to know that he is that first! Furthermore, if you are involved in a hand against two unknown quantities you have to proceed with even more caution. It’s dangerous to assume that one player is a loose cannon, let alone two. That’s just irrational. That said, a hand unfolded the other day that infuriated me because sound logic led to me folding the best hand after the river and I would have tripled up. If only I had put everybody on A-K and hoped for the best…

To set the scene, I was playing in a multi-table freezeout tournament when after a lull of activity I woke up with A-A under-the-gun, meaning I was first to act pre-flop. I raised the pot to four times the big blind and given my recent inactivity and my position this should have looked strong to any keen observers. To explain this further, a raise from early position will generally represent strength because it is a high-risk play to try and bluff everybody with a whole table left to act. Who knows what you could run into. Somebody raising to steal the blinds is therefore much more likely to do so from middle-to-late position. There was no reason to assume that my raise wasn’t bonafide and therefore one might assume that most players would only call me with strong holdings of their own. But ‘most players’ aren’t ‘all players’ and herein lay the start of my problems. Two players called me in middle positions and I had never seen either one of them play a significant hand before.

My next complication was to be the board after the flop came K-Q-3 and I bet strongly and both players called quickly. Experience has led me to be very wary in this scenario. Let’s just say that I wasn’t chuckling to myself about how much money I was about to win with my overpair. Instead, I was already concerned that one or both players had K-Q or a set. Then a jack turn card made my heart sink still further. Let me explain my rationale at this point. I was now losing if either player held K-Q, K-J, Q-J, K-K, Q-Q, J-J, 3-3 or A-10. Admittedly, a couple of these hands seemed unlikely but there were just so many, and what else could they be calling with? Any lower pairs would surely have been folded on the flop and the list of realistic hands where I was still winning with A-A seemed short and unlikely. Maybe they could both have A-K or A-Q? Wishful thinking surely.

The river card brought a five that didn’t seem too threatening but since I assumed the damage was already done this offered scant consolation. I checked my hand and desperately hoped my two opponents would do likewise or at least bet light. No such luck. An all-in bet from one was swiftly followed by an all-in call from player two. The pot was now massive but I just couldn’t see how I could call with my own tournament life at stake. Had I believed that I would win here even 1 in 3 times I might well have called, given the value and size of the pot. Of course I folded and what I saw was somewhat sole-destroying.

Opponent 1 had J-10, or third pair with an average kicker. He had called the pre-flop raise quite loosely, then unsurprisingly followed his straight draw on the flop. He picked up a pair on the turn giving him more outs before effectively bluffing all-in at the end having seen my weakness. I would say this move was still optimistic considering the third party in the hand. And so it proved as opponent 2 claimed the glory with K-9. In other words my solitary overpair would have triumphed over both. But could I realistically have assumed that this guy was taking on my big pre-flop under-the-gun raise with K-9? He was certainly never folding once he hit top pair and kicker concerns clearly never entered his mind.

It was an interesting example of how hazardous it can be to be confronted by two dubious aggressive players in one hand. Had Player 1 checked at the end with J-10, given that he had some showdown value, it may well have been a different story. Player 2 with K-9 might well have checked out as well, thus handing me victory. Equally, had I only been confronted by one all-in it would have much more conceivable to call. I console myself with the conviction that 9 times out of 10 it would have been a good fold given the information I had to work with. It’s not good to become a guy who can never lay down aces anyway. That said, I could have done with all those chips.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

It’s very important to get a read on other players that can shape the way you will approach them in the future. If somebody bets whenever the play is checked to him then he might be trappable with a big hand. On the other hand if a guy wants to check-raise all his best hands then you need to ensure that you’re not the one getting trapped. There are other characters who like to limp in with AA to make sure they get some action. You need to be aware that these individuals may have strong holdings even in the absence of a pre-flop raise or re-raise. Another player may bet into the pot whenever he flops a flush draw. There are many play patterns to watch out for, and if they can be remembered, noted and digested then judgements will become smarter.

So how much can be learnt from the different observations that we make? In the case of a renowned ‘AA limper’ I’ve already suggested we need to proceed with caution because a call disguises a big hand much more than a raise. That said, what more can we deduce? Well, I would speculate that a player who limps AA all the time is inexperienced, over-values his hands and slowplays his way into trouble frequently. The reasoning behind this is that the strength of AA is greatly diminished in a multi-way pot and while calling adds disguise, it also makes the likelihood of several opponents much greater. Frankly, an experienced player has already learnt this lesson and will only slowplay rockets perhaps one time in ten. On the other hand an inexperienced individual will probably just classify himself as hugely unlucky every time he loses with AA in a multi-way pot. Over time the penny will drop.

What of the character who check-raises all his best hands? Let’s say he only leads the betting when he has nothing or very little, but the check-raise appears every time he is genuinely strong, or hits a draw. Once you’ve seen this pattern emerge over a period of time then you must be very wary of how much you bet your own hand, if at all. In a pot between the two of you it may sometimes be best to turn his check-raise play into the much less fruitful ‘check-check’ scenario. Remember the check-raise play ceases to exist where nobody else bets! This is useful when you have an average hand and wish to showdown cheaply. On the other hand, if you’re pretty sure that you’re winning even though he likes his cards as well then the pot is likely to become massive. Suddenly all you need to do is bet your hand as normal and wait for the check-raiser to dig his own grave.

When the check-raiser calls on a draw and the river card looks to have hit him then extreme caution is required more than ever. Most players bet out with their flush or straight on the river to make sure they get some pay-off. No so the check-raiser. If first to act he will probably still find it irresistible to check. The temptation for you to bet must therefore be resisted at all costs – unless you can beat his straight or flush of course! This can mean checking out a great hand such as a set on the river. If this is done then the frustration of losing with a great hand on the final card should be tempered by the knowledge that you didn’t pay-off your rival. Unlucky yes, but you did play the better poker and that’s what counts in the long run. Limiting your losses on the bad moments is as crucial as maximising the profits at the good times.

Finally there is the competitor who jumps into bet whenever he flops a flush draw. The psychology behind this play has much to teach us as well. The thing about drawing hands is that, like many a poker player, they seem full of promise but often amount to nothing. We all grow weary of calling on a draw only to see it fade into the abyss once more. So what’s the alternative? Bet into the draw of course! That way if you hit the draw you win, and if your opponent folds, you win. Easy right? You’ve covered all angles? Wrong. It doesn’t play out this way because nobody believes you have a strong hand. If for example you call a pre-flop raiser out of position and then bet into him before he has a chance to act, it always looks weak. The thought crossing your canny opponents’ minds will be ‘if he’s that strong, then why not wait for the inevitable continuation bet from the raiser to suck more chips into the pot?’

The common ground with all these examples is that they may have some value when deployed in exceptional circumstances. However, the players who make any of these moves routinely show a naivety of what those around them are thinking. The irony is that experienced players see many ill-advised moves coming a mile off because they made exactly the same questionable moves themselves in the past.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker