The drawback of these events is that the juicy, dangled carrot of big-time success will seldom be munched, even by good players. If we assume that a typical satellite will reward about 10% of the field with a place at the main event, we begin to see why. A decent player may reasonably hope to qualify about once in every three attempts with this ratio. Then, if the top 10% of players receive all the money in the main event, a similar conversion rate could be expected. I would suggest that these success rates are still optimistic for most mere mortals, but even they indicate that money back from the initial investment may only occur about once in every six attempts. This may all sound quite discouraging but slow conversion rates will be the last thing on your mind when you see that £50 turned into £8000.

Another pleasing revelation is that many players are simply horrendous at playing the satellite format, with its unusual dynamic. The key concept to grasp, and it sounds patronising to spell it out, is that there are no winners, only qualifiers. If 20 people earn a seat at the main event then 20^th is as worthwhile as 1^st. Yet unbelievably there are always clowns in these events who are determined to risk everything to have the biggest chip stack. ‘What can I tell you, I’m a winner. I play to win,’ is the sort of ludicrous twaddle I’ve heard too many times to count. What could be more impressive than beating a group of individuals who don’t mind being beaten? Well, pretty much everything. If I’m in 12^th position and have accurately calculated that I can qualify from this spot without playing another hand then that’s what I’ll do. Mission has been accomplished. It’s what any sane individual would do. Poker prowess has very little to do with it.

Satisfyingly, if you play even a few satellites I can almost guarantee you will witness one of these macho bullies knock himself out when he could have left the room and still qualified. Adrenalin junkies feel compelled to play average hands when they should even be throwing away aces. Then, at the opposite end of the scale, but equally incompetent in their own way, lurks the satellite coward.

An online satellite I was recently in had a rather generous 100 seats to be won with 130 players remaining. Surprisingly, the blinds weren’t too high yet so most of us weren’t feeling much pressure. Then the rather inactive player to my left sent a message saying ‘Let’s all fold every hand and we’ll all qualify.’ This sentiment was soon followed by ‘Ok? Is everyone agreed?’ Only two other players were keen to join his gang largely because it was far too early for most people to coast home without playing. He simply had no idea how long these 30 people would hold on for and how the blinds would inevitably reach nosebleed territory. The result of his initiative was predictable. A couple of us stole his blinds every time round and he was the first at the table to bust out. He might as well have posted a note saying ‘I’m nervous about playing and will fold everything unless I have a monster.’

It’s always amusing to see a player try to organise a communal pact in an internet game. It may be possible if attempted in a live game by a large, unforgiving fellow who seems adamant about people toeing the party line – but not online. It seems to be the height of optimism to expect a group of poker players to abandon their natural instincts to join a socialist movement.

Satellites may be lucrative if played sensibly, yet not fearfully. Only time will tell. Success can’t be analysed in anything but the long term and may suit one individual more than another. But one thing is for sure, the format brings out all the game’s odd characters.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

Let’s say the blinds are 100-200. Given the chip ratio described above, your opponent is in a strong position but he would be wrong to think he has the game won. There is still plenty of poker to be played in this game. One mindset I might adopt is to evaluate what my prospects look like if I doubled up. I realise that if I achieve this before my stack drops below 2000 then I will then have a minimum of 4000 in comparison to his 11000 maximum. If I then double-up again before I drop below 3000 then I will have a minimum of 6000 chips compared to his 9000 maximum. In this scenario there would suddenly be all to play for and I would have the momentum. This may sound like basic wishful thinking but it’s important to realise that winning just two hands I commit to could turn the game on its head. On those terms the predicament seems less daunting.

The other crucial aspect of this mindset is that I still allow myself some scope to fold. When I have 3000 chips and the blinds are 100-200 I’ve decided that the situation only becomes critical if I fall below 2000. Too many players panic when they face a huge chip deficit regardless of the blind situation. The psychology of the situation must not be discarded either. Your opponent may expect you to be desperate and panicky; he may be thrown off-kilter if you remain calm and collected. For his part he may think the game is won and get impatient if it drags out.

It’s quite likely that a big stack will push his chips all-in on most hands in this situation with a very wide range of cards. Remember, he’s probably gained his big stack by bulldozing through the rest of the field with considerable success. He’s feeling confident and he’s on a roll. This can lead to complacency and loose aggression. But in effect every all-in push he makes risks 3000 of his own chips to win a likely 300. This may not sound too outrageous with 12000 chips behind him but one wrong move could transform the game. One successful call with your short-stack and the net-swing is 6000 chips. Suddenly the cavalier push with 9-3 off-suit looks a little rash.

So what cards do you chance your arm with against a big-stack bully? Well, if he’s all-in on every hand then we can allocate him a card range of any two. But obviously we want to call when we have an edge. I suggest a calling range begins at any ace, most kings, or any two high cards in this spot. If you succeed in doubling up to around 4000 chips before the blinds rise, you can then become more selective. It then doesn’t matter if you lose six hands in a row in blinds so long as you can triumph on the big showdown.

If your stack does recover enough to be threatening, then an aggressive player may refine his strategy from constant all-ins, to constant raising. If this happens at least you’re being taken a little more seriously. At this point you have gained an additional play option. With more chips at your disposal it is now possible to call a raise without going all-in. While this can be an advantage it will lead a weak player to ruin. For example, calling raises with decent heads-up hands like A-5 is generally ill-advised. Against an aggressive bully this is a re-raise all-in hand, because while it’s reasonable to think you’re ahead, it’s a lousy hand to see a flop with.

Having said all this, if the blinds are crippling in relation to your stack size then you really can’t hang about. I would suggest that your situation is critical if your chip stack represents 5 or 6 big blinds or less. In a SNG this means that if the blinds are 200-400 and you hold 2400 chips or less then you should push all-in on the small blind every time with any two cards. That really is no time to be choosy.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

The worst thought process you can adopt is ‘I’ll just sit tight until I’ve made the money and then I’ll go for it.’ If this approach goes badly then you may simply be blinded out as the other players exploit your timidity. Rest assured that the best players will constantly be observing and making notes on weak players who can be bullied at this vital juncture. If you are destined to go out on the bubble, be bold and brave, not pathetic and gutless. The latter will be much harder to digest if the worst comes to the worst.

Biding your time is clearly self-destructive if you are the smallest stack at the table because everybody else is in relatively good shape unless you make a successful move. This is fairly obvious to most players but the dangers facing a medium-stack are much more frequently ignored. The smallest stack will frequently recover rapidly if the blinds are quite high and he is shrewd enough to throw his chips in at every good opportunity. Suddenly the medium stack has become the small-stack and the blinds are getting evermore threatening.

Crucially, even when a cautious bubble approach does result in a money finish it still may not have been a successful strategy. The reason for this is that limping into the smallest payout position should never be the objective – you must play to win wherever possible. This may sound like obvious posturing to some people because, of course, we all want to win. But the play-to-win approach has to be taken seriously when you consider the reward structure of most poker tournaments. Take for example the pay-out structure of a typical $55 SNG. First place will typically receive $250 (50% of the prize pool minus fees), second place earns $150 (30%) and third place receives $100 (20%).

Consequently, one first place finish is as good as a second and third combined. So how should this influence our bubble strategy? Put simply, go for the wins and don’t worry about a few fourth places along the way. If in a run of ten games at $55 I emerge victorious in 3 and don’t make the money in the other 7 I will earn $750 from $550 staked. However, if the run of ten games yields 0 wins, 3 seconds, 2 thirds and the rest outside the money I will earn $650 from $550 staked. In other words finishing in the money 30% of the time with all victories is more profitable than making the money 50% of the time with this combination of second and thirds.

In strategic terms this should mean that you aren’t afraid of making a big play which could win you the game even if it could also result in your elimination on the bubble. To illustrate this point imagine a typical SNG bubble scenario where one huge stack is raising every hand against three evenly matched short stacks, one of which is you. The play passes to the big stack on the small blind who moves all-in for the sixth hand in a row. You are sat on the big blind with A9, what should you do? If you know that the big stack is pushing with any two cards then A9 has to be an easy call. It only becomes difficult because of the threat of elimination at this critical stage. Of course you could be unlucky and he has a genuinely big hand this time, or you could be outdrawn by a junk hand, but no matter. All you can do is get your chips in when the odds appear to be in your favour. In the long term a call with A9 in this spot should be profitable. Doubling up at this point gives you a genuine chance of a precious victory. Folding is weak and lacking in courage.

The value of bubble aggression is only magnified further in a multi-table event when the temptation to limp into the money is even greater. You really want something to show for your time and efforts after several hours of play. But this survive at all costs mentality again needs to be banished. The prizes at stake for the top places are even more significant now. If 18^th place is $100 then 1^st place may well be $3000. Winning the event once is better than scraping into the teen positions two dozen times. Top players will judge their success on how often they make the final few spots rather than how often they make ‘the money’. Playing a strong bubble and picking up pots against the meek is a vital part of reaping such rewards.

The Poker Grafter writes for Oddschecker Poker

With my many online sit-n-go rivalries, image and reputation are key factors in my strategic decisions. When I play ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ I attempt to use my knowledge of him and his verdict on me to my future advantage. To explain the background to this rivalry I should explain that ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ and I have crossed paths on many SNG 6-seat tournaments.

The first time we played each other I noticed that when the play got 3 or 4-handed he raised pre-flop an inordinate amount of the time, but folded to almost every re-raise. This of course isn’t that unusual since it’s what happens when somebody tries to constantly steal the blinds without very much to back it up. It isn’t even that bad a strategy since so many players will let you steal with nothing, even though they are very suspicious. Calling or re-raising with nothing is difficult to do. I started to feel that ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ was pushing his luck by making this move too often and consequently stopping the likes of me from stealing. I couldn’t stand for that! So how was I to counteract this infuriatingly effective tactic against weak players? I had to start re-stealing.

To simply call more of his loose raises was not strong enough. I had to be prepared to re-raise him all-in and force the fold. This was a man who always responded to re-raises in precisely the same way. He would take his time, agonise over the decision, tell the table that he had a marginal hand to call with, like A-J…and then fold. There were two possibilities. Possibility A was that he was always telling the truth and that he did have a good hand every time he raised, but it just wasn’t quite enough to call a big re-raise with. This is very dubious when you raise 75% of the hands 3 or 4-handed. Possibility B was that he raised with an enormous range of cards and when he got caught with his hand in the till, he just folded. Much more likely. My suspicions were confirmed when I finally did get to see his cards a few times – nothing as good as AJ was to be seen.

‘Operation Re-steal’ had to happen. This was all a matter of timing, and would inevitably rely on some good fortune. There was always a possibility that he would have a genuinely big hand or that one of the weak tight players found something. But it was a risk that I would have to take occasionally. The move began to work several times over the course of a few games. I didn’t want to push my luck so it was a rare play. But, eventually, I did get caught out.  ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ raised with A-Ko and I moved all-in with 10-9s. For one night only my rival was to become ‘Mr Raise-Call’. I fortuitously won the showdown and all hell broke loose.

I’ve been folding AJ to your re-raises and now you donk me with 10-9,’ he exclaimed. Well firstly I knew, and he knew, that he raised with a load of junk half the time, so the AJ comment was irrelevant. Secondly, I moved with a hand like 10-9s for a reason. I still had a 41% chance of showdown success against AK and a 49% hope had I been called by a pocket pair lower than 9-9. It was a calculated risk, with considerable fold equity and part of a carefully thought-out strategy. But he couldn’t see past the luck factor and the reckless nature of the play when looked at in isolation.

After that encounter we have never sat at the same table without ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ commenting on my infamous ‘donk play’. I couldn’t be happier. He establishes my table image as a fish, which a typically tight-aggressive player thrives upon. It makes it so much easier to get my big hands paid off. You really can’t buy that sort of publicity.  As for our own personal battle, I think ‘Mr Raise-Fold’ is a bit more wary about raising my big blind with junk when he knows (he thinks) what I’ll push all-in with. And when I do wake up with AK and push his raise I’m now pretty confident that he’ll be calling me with a hand like AJ – if he ever actually has it.

The first important thing to accept is that anything can happen on any given occasion. I’m always amazed when I hear players predicting their imminent success with clueless bravado. Even if we take the considerable leap of faith that such a player is the best at the table, the luck factor can unravel him at any moment. Once you accept that anything can happen in a one-off game soon you will realise that the same evaluation also applies to a run of 10, 20 or even 50 games.

As a long-time student of the game, I think the one thing still capable of surprising me to this day is just how streaky the runs of fortune can be. With this in mind, a key factor is being able to cope with bad luck at any time. This is always a major challenge from a psychological perspective but it becomes nigh on impossible when playing at a stake you can barely afford, or feeling that you must win.

If you are a good player, and by this I mean you have enjoyed success over a prolonged period of time, then your bankroll will grow in the long term, but it must be there to protect you in the short term. If you have established a rate of return (ROI) of 10% over 1000 games then there is a decent indication of what you can expect to earn at that stake if you play a further 1000 games. I would cautiously suggest that it would be reasonable to think that the same player, in a further 1000 games would probably see an ROI of between 5-15%. It’s only over a huge sample of games that we can start to look at projected earnings as the luck factor evens out.

Some players may feel that 200-500 games are a fair sample from which to draw conclusions. All I can say is that from my own experiences, one 500 set of games can produce quite variant results to another batch of 500. Basic logic suggests with any survey that the bigger the sample, the more credible the results. Maybe one day I’ll muse that even 1000 games isn’t a sufficient sample to draw reasonable conclusions from.

If we follow the example above then we can start to see the importance of an appropriate bankroll, even for a successful player. If a player enters 1000 games with an entry fee of $55, he will be investing $55 000 in total. This seems, and is, a massive outlay but if he has an ROI of 10% on this run then he will re-coup a further $5500 by the end of this period. So theoretically a bankroll that begun at $55 000 would then be up to $60 500. But very few people who play regularly at mid-level stakes have $55 000 to work with from the outset. So what is a reasonable bankroll to start playing hundreds of $55 games without putting yourself in peril?

ROI is just one factor to contemplate. Perhaps a bigger consideration is to estimate how much you will lose on a bad run, and at what point you might drop down in stakes. For example, a player who begins with $5000 may decide that he will play  $55 games unless he drops below the $3000 mark. For this to occur he can lose the equivalent of 36 entry fees before he’s forced to re-think his strategy. While it is hugely unlikely that he will fail to cash in 36 consecutive games, a losing run of $2000 is very possible even for an accomplished player.

This may sound discouraging, (and some may disagree that a good player could lose $2000 at these stakes) but it doesn’t need to be. To be aware that bad runs will happen and have the bankroll to cope with them is half the battle; in fact it’s much more than half the battle. Let’s say that I had played 2000 games at $55 stakes and knew that my worst run in that time was a $3000 slump but that I was definitely winning in the long-term. Secondly, let’s argue that I would drop down in stakes if my bankroll fell below $4000. With these factors in mind I would be content with a starting bankroll of $7000. This way it would need an unprecedented bad run for me to run into difficulties.

Although I’ve focused on $55 games here, the thought processes and issues to look at are exactly the same whatever stakes are involved. Bankrolls aren’t just there for the losing players - they are vital to even the very best.

As I touched on before, continuation betting off your own pre-flop raises is so commonplace that to not do so is generally regarded as weak. It is weak to hand over the initiative on any occasion when ‘first bet wins.’ One of the hardest things to evaluate is which scenarios are ‘first bet wins’ spots. Many ill-advised players will conclude that since so many pots are won by the anticipated continuation bet that doing so every time makes sense. I would agree that the continuation bet is the right play more often than not but, more controversially, I will argue that sometimes it is so doomed to failure that the weak play is the right play.

I think it’s abundantly clear that continuation betting can be very effective but I want to focus on its limitations and pitfalls.

To explain this thought process I’ll refer to my sit-n-go (SNG) strategy. In a single table tournament with 10 competitors the principle early objective is to survive. In a typical mid-stake tournament – such as for $55 -  at least two or three players are likely to play loose aggressive poker from the outset. This can be a great time to pick up a major hand for a good player because some ‘action’ is almost guaranteed and calling stations are likely to get involved with borderline hands. This will often mean that overpairs will double-up against players who can’t fold top pair and that AK and AQ will often plunder chips from opponents who play weak kickers.

This is all well and good but the abundance of worse, loose players can be a double-edged sword. (Note that in SNGs, players who play loose from the outset will be bad players 99% of the time).  The trouble that can come from reckless continuation betting at low-quality opponents is illustrated most starkly by that most frustrating of hands, AK. When I began playing regular SNGs this was the hand and the situation that continually put me in the soup.

Two players limp in from early positions since ‘the blinds are so low that it’s always nice to see a flop.’ The play passes to me who has to raise with AK. Let me repeat that I feel obliged to raise, because if 6-7 players limp I may well be in big trouble even if I seem to flop well. But with several loose aggressive players at the table my bet still attracts three players who will call a pre-flop raise with almost anything in the early stages of the tournament. The flop comes 10-Q-3. What do I do? Well, the old me came out firing with the continuation bet. I would do this because a strong bet can take the pot uncontested and if I got called then there were several cards I could still hit on the turn. But I don’t do this anymore because experience showed that all I generally got for my trouble was a depleted chip stack and irritated. This familiar situation needed to be identified as decidedly not a ‘first bet wins’ scenario. The continuation bet was no more than wishful thinking; it was rarely likely to work.

Now I adopt Plan B. Put simply, I don’t bet the flop and if I can’t see another card cheaply then I’ll fold. Now I realise this will be hugely disappointing to maverick players wanting to read about daring check raise bluffs that put the calling stations back in their place. This is early-phase SNG strategy at its most unsexy. Check-fold sounds lame, it sounds weak – and it is. But in the early stages of these tournaments self-preservation is what counts. Of course we all want to double-up early on and this can happen. But it will now take a lot more than ace-high and a gutshot straight draw to get me betting at three players who all want to chase. Put in these terms I think that the tentative approach sounds like a no-brainer. It’s worth emphasising that the mutli-way nature of this pot is the crucial factor in declining to bet the flop. Had only one opponent seen the flop on my raise I would certainly be betting most boards, particularly if in position.

I’ve concluded that weak play is acceptable in this situation, as much as it riles me to admit it. I console myself with the theory that if I know it seems weak then actually it isn’t that weak. Most weak players are oblivious to their own limitations where as I have escaped where strength would have most likely lost me chips. Furthermore, if any opponents regard me as weak then I can use that to my advantage later on when the pots really are worth fighting for. Concede the battle to win the war.

Firstly, if you raise with strong cards and hit the flop then the continuation bet is typically the right play to make. Your opponents may well call you with mediocre holdings such as top pair with a weak kicker, second pair or a draw. Average-poor players are always likely to do this because they find it hard to fold. This resolve is particularly tested when they’re on the blinds and they really want to see a flop. Then, if they get any piece of it they want to stay involved. From their perspective, all you did was raise and continue betting. That doesn’t mean anything because everyone bets off their own raises. You could have nothing. The dangerous mentality of a chaser is ‘I don’t have much but I have something. Mr Continuation Bet could easily have nothing, and something beats nothing.’

But what about continuation betting when you absolutely nail the flop – when you hit the nuts? This conjures up a dilemma for the pre-flop raiser who always bets the flop but now really wants some action. The great temptation is to suddenly check the flop and hope somebody else gets interested. This can work brilliantly against a novice or any player who has hit the flop well too. But the problem is that most experienced players around the table will hear a siren go off as soon as you check. Nothing ‘announces’ a big hand quite so loudly as a player who has been continuation betting all day, suddenly checking. With this play pattern good players will tread very carefully.

In one obvious example if I raise with AK, get one caller and the board comes Q-A-A, what should I do? The temptation is to check but then even the doziest observer is going to know that I have a great hand. If my opponent has nothing at this stage then a free card is unlikely to change that fact unless he miraculously hits a straight or a full house on the turn, which would be a disaster for me anyway. Furthermore, only a true optimist would attempt to bluff me in this spot when my check looks so strong.

So what if I do make the continuation bet? Well, naturally, there is a strong chance that he has missed the flop and will fold. But crucially if he has anything at all then my weak-looking bet will only encourage him. If he has a lower ace (other than AQ) then he is in big trouble but convinced he is winning. If he holds a queen then second pair looks very tasty against my ‘unconvincing’ bet. Even if my adversary holds any other pocket pair (other than QQ) he may well wrongly think he is in front and decide to raise. A particularly brave soul, let’s face it - probably a fish - may even try to take me off the hand with absolutely nothing if he concludes from my continuation bet that I don’t have an ace.

Conversely, if I’ve raised pre-flop with 99 and the flop comes A-Q-Q I may use my knowledge of what a continuation bet seems to represent here to play my hand shrewdly. Now I may check the flop with the intention of betting the turn to fully represent the ace. Admittedly, this is a move involving some risk since my opponent may have a hand themselves. But thinking logically, if they have hit the flop then my continuation bet at that point would have failed anyway. So really I’m only causing myself potential greater bother with the solitary turn card. Even then my opponent may well fold his superior hand if he’s convinced that I hold an ace.

It’s crucial to realise that there is no definitive right and wrong move in these scenarios. It depends on so many factors – detailed knowledge of your opponent, your current table image, how many hands you’ve played recently, position and chip stack size – to name a few. But robotically betting off your raises without forethought is doomed to failure in the long run. Being predictable is catastrophic against the best players and sooner or later they will punish you for it. So don’t get out-thought and out-played by always doing the same thing.

I had an image of my irate Swedish foe desperately trying to decipher my identity from the only information at his disposal – namely an alias that bore no relation to my real name. ‘Right, I know he lives in London and he appears to like football. That’s enough to be getting on with for now - off to the airport! Just as soon as I’ve put on some trousers and said goodbye to mummy.’

I wondered if when he finally did track me down whether he might feel, on reflection, that he had over-reacted. Admittedly, my audacity in beating him with AQ against his mighty AK was indeed unforgivable. Yet after a plane journey for reflection he might feel that other people on his hit list had committed even more heinous poker crimes. There was that guy in Berlin who knocked him out of a tournament with Jacks when he had Queens. Not to mention the fiend in Rome who re-raised all-in with 8-2o, outrageously fluked it, and then claimed it was a mis-click.

I always tended to assume that any confrontational chat in online poker was as unproductive as it was unpleasant. If people didn’t want to listen to you they could simply turn off the dialogue and get on with their lives. Even tough talking in its less aggressive form should be quite inconsequential. A classic example of this is the player who thinks he can verbally protect his big blind. When play passes to the small blind, who is considering whether to push, the cry from the big blind will be, ‘I call’. The intention would seem to be to force a fold. If he wants to force a fold, then he surely can’t be that strong himself. Unless he realises this, and really does want some action. In other words, the comment can be interpreted to mean anything and is best to be ignored. The small blind’s decision should be based on other factors.

The verbal big blind defence may go a stage further with the utterance, ‘next time I call with any two cards.’ This comment always strikes me as pretty desperate. You might as well be saying, ‘ok guys, be careful, I’m about to go on tilt.’ It’s exactly what you want to be hearing just before you pick up a genuinely good hand. At this point a gentle bump raise will often encourage an inevitable all-in re-raise to show that he means business. In other words, hook, line and sinker.

So is tough talking on your big blind a waste of time, particularly when you’re playing online? Well, don’t get me wrong, it really should be. But my playing experience has led me to think it ultimately may have some benefit in the right circumstance. Abusive, threatening language has no merit for anyone, but the subtle suggestion that you’ll call, or that you suspect ‘stealing’ may be beneficial so long as it doesn’t sound too desperate.

I suggested earlier that the small blind could read anything into the ‘I call’ comment and should ignore it. The fact is though that many players don’t ignore these comments and that it does affect their decision-making. A weak-minded individual can be willed into folding where they might have called or pushed in a borderline scenario. I’ve seen it happen time and again. I’ll leave it to others to decide whether such mind games are in the spirit of poker. But the fact that this issue can even be discussed dispels the myth that online poker is simply a game of probability and luck, lacking any of the subtleties of the ‘live’ game. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Newcomers to Holdem are particularly prone to slowplaying the big guns. When I started playing I probably limped in with AA more often than I raised, assuming I was first into the pot. I thought there was nothing more annoying than raising three times the big blind just to see everybody fold. If it was the early stages of a sit-n-go I’d be acquiring a meagre 30 chips from the blinds with the best possible holding. Sickening. This happened to me once or twice before I vowed that next time I would just call pre-flop and guarantee some action.

Twenty minutes later I was fortunate enough to pick up AA again which I had already resolved to call with pre-flop. Inevitably nobody raised behind me and I seemed to trigger off some sort of limp-fest. All the calling stations came leaping out of the woodwork. Seven people saw the flop and before I knew it I had my chips all-in to ultimately lose against 10-9 and J10. It’s around this moment that I, like most new players, realised that what’s worse than winning 30 chips with AA is losing 1500 chips with the same hand.

Now don’t get me wrong, this isn’t a black or white decision-making process; I’ve seen the slowplayed rockets triple-up many a player. It can provide an element of disguise to a hand that combined with its inherent strength can be very potent. But when I look at the many examples of a slowplayed AA triumphing it will normally be because the hand is a strong one and not because ‘calling’ pre-flop was an act of unfathomable genius. As always every situation has to be looked at on its own merits. What I would say with confidence and experience is that when I do assess the scenarios nowadays, playing AA as fast as possible seems like the correct move 90% of the time. When you’ve lost thousands of times with AA you start to appreciate its true value. Top pair is a good hand but certainly not a great one in the context of a seven-card game.

The play after the flop is, of course, massively important. Up to this point I’ve generally equated ‘slowplay’ with ‘calling’ pre-flop. But many an ill-advised player takes the trap concept further by checking a threatening board with the sole intention of raising after the turn or river. If you witness this play pattern in a multi-way pot you’ll know that you’re either up against a novice or a poor player. If another ace doesn’t arrive by the river it’s pure insanity to be milking the pot with nothing more than a pair, albeit a very good one. There comes a point when slowplay and bad play amounts to the same thing.

Threatening boards for AA include a flopped pair, particularly with two queens or kings. Now you should be worried about anyone who’s seen a flop with the likes of AQ, AK or KQ, which is quite likely in a multi-way pot. Other potential flop dangers obviously include flush and straight draws, but in these cases you should be ahead and must bet firmly to charge people to chase. But the real danger is that every flop looks quite good with AA in the locker. Learning how to throw the hand away at the right moment is the real test of champions. We’ve all played against players who call all-in with AK after a low flop. Just imagine what sort of cataclysmic event would have to take place to make them fold the bullets!

So when is a good time to finesse play AA? (When I say finesse I essentially mean slowplaying with guile, and reasoning that goes beyond ‘if I raise, everyone else might fold…which is annoying’) Well, if a tournament is short-handed and has essentially become a push and fold contest it is a particularly great time to wake up with aces. If I could choose my moment to trap with a premium hand this would be it, and I want to be in the small blind as well, if that’s not asking too much. In this seat, and with only the blinds to act, a call will normally look like a weak play and the big blind is quite likely to push. Perfect. For me, this is one of the few occasions when a raise may be the wrong move to make. The seat position is crucial though because a flat call on the button for example can seem very suspicious. If a player who has raised or folded every single time suddenly limps in, the alarm bells are ringing. The monster hand is too easily flagged up.

Tellingly, the top players rarely muck about with their best hands. This is normally as good a guide to how to play as you will get. If you frequently slowplay and trap with any two cards you’ll get burnt. And don’t expect any sympathy when you lose trying to be sneaky with AA. Everyone else at the table wants the same cards and the opportunity to play them properly.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

Now we all know that the ‘beauty’ of Texas Holdem - depending on your point of view – is that just anybody can win a game if they’re lucky enough, regardless of experience and ability. Only in the long-term will the best players prevail. But it seems to me that fixed limit poker takes the biscuit. It could have been invented to lure in unsuspecting, naïve new players to the lair. There may even be an unwritten poker rule that states that the newcomer at the table has special outdraw privileges. Whatever this pact with the devil involves, it seems to allow a novice fixed limit cash player to play every hand, call every bet and still win all the money.

When it’s going well it seems to be the easiest game in the world but when events turn on you it’s hard not to feel powerless. After much deliberation I concluded that good players would be wasting their time pinning all their hopes on fixed limit cash games. This is largely down to being unable to vary your bet size. If you think about it this is a major handicap to good play.

Let’s say for instance that you play tightly until you wake up with a premium hand, which you raise with pre-flop. You’ve already made your one play. It’s now completely out of your hands how many opponents you’ll get. If the competition is loose then it’s not unusual for 4-5 players to call any number of the fixed-sized bets with a wide-range of holdings just to see a flop. You’re big hand is already in huge danger. Individually, the others are heavy underdogs but the chances of one of them beating you by the river are high, especially if your monster fails to improve.

The following scenario has played out in a similar way more times than I care to mention. In a 10-seat ring game I opened the raising with KK. Three players called the raise and one re-raised. When the action returned to me it barely mattered whether I re-raised again or not because history suggested that the players who had called the initial bets weren’t going anywhere without at least seeing a flop first. My four opponents had AQ, 77, 45(spades) and J10 respectively. (I might add that the quality of hands being called with on this occasion was quite high. Fixed limit cash games frequently attract menaces who re-raise to the maximum pre-flop with 7-2o as well).

Anyway, when the flop came Jspade- 9spade-Qheart, I was still leading with an over-pair and feeling obliged to bet and call raises with KK. There was no way the guys with 45(spades), AQ and J10 were going anywhere having all hit a piece of the flop. The thrill-seeker with 77 took the commonly held view that there was ‘too much money in the pot to be folding now either. Fixed limit might as well be called ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’ poker.

So to clarify my predicament I was now in a huge pot, and leading after the flop, but the danger cards which threatened me were any spade, any 7, any 8, any J, any Q and any A. Oh and I nearly forgot, either of the remaining Kings. One of which ‘miraculously’ did appear on the turn giving me a set, but, of course, Mr J10 had hit his straight. There was no miracle full house on the river for me, only another tale of despair. What could I have done differently? Fold after the flop when I was still ahead, or maybe just fold KK from the outset? It was a ridiculous situation which will always occur if you can’t limit the field and you can’t stop the chasing with a big killer bet. In other words, I concluded, fixed limit cash is a game to avoid.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker