Milking the Bully

July 2nd, 2009 by thepokergrafter

Sitting with a paltry number of chips when a big stack bully is running over the play can be an intimidating and frustrating experience. With a chip stack at least three times bigger than anybody else, and twelve times more than many at the table, the bully is in an enviable position. He has power. The power that comes from knowing that anybody who tangles with him will be jeopardising their future in the tournament. The bully will always have less equity invested at any one time, allowing him the freedom, and providing the confidence, to raise every hand with scant regard to hand selection. At the bubble phase of a big multi-table tournament this can cause nervous opponents to freeze and throw away cards that could easily ‘double them up’. The fear factor will quite possibly help them squeeze into the lowly money places but it will also deny them a rare shot at one of the big prizes.

A $55 rebuy tournament I was in last night demonstrated why people get scared of the big stacks, how unfair the game can be, but also how a small stack can be revived single-handedly by the aggressive tactics of a chip leader.

The first significant incident I will describe may make you question (yet again) why we all bother with poker in the first place. Sometimes you do everything right for the cruellest of outcomes. The third largest stack at the table, with the unenviable position of sitting to the immediate right of ’the chippie’ opened the pot with a standard raise; his first raise in some while. The chip leader next door immediately called and everybody else folded with great haste. One would not have to be an acute observer of the game to assess that quiet, solid Player A, under no pressure to take chances, probably had the better start cards than bullying aggressive Player B. This assumption proved correct as Q(s)-Q(d) took on K(h)-9(h) Fireworks were therefore assured when the flop delivered Q(h)-10(d)-3(h). Player A bet out firmly on the flop, no doubt realising that despite holding ‘the nuts’ of top set, he was still vulnerable to drawing hands. Player B, no stranger to raising with nothing to apply pressure, now had a flush and gutshot draw to make that very move with. His raise was inevitably, and correctly, followed by a re-raise all-in and a call that signalled a dramatic showdown and a massive pot. The joy Player A felt on the flop would have diminished sharply when revealed how many outs Player B still had, indeed still a 32% chance of victory. The A(h) on the turn was a killer blow that handed the chip leader a flush that would not be conquered by a full house on the river. In an instance Player A was out of the tournament in 53rd position (50 places paid) with a great hand and a sob story to boot.

The next eye-catching moment involving the big stack had a rather different outcome, though only just. This time the bully raised with 4-8o and got immediately shoved by a shortish, but not desperate stack with AQ. The big stack correctly called the all-in re-raise with his trash hand as he was getting odds of better than 2:1. It’s always worth remembering that even 2-7o has a 32% chance of toppling AK in a showdown. I’m not convinced that Mr AQ had calculated these odds and the likelihood of a showdown with only 51 competitors remaining. Maybe he was just brave enough to risk being the last person out before ‘the money’ but I’m not so sure. I suspect from the speed of the move that he thought some fold equity remained and that he might win the pot uncontested. From my point of view I would rather make that play, in his position, with a high pocket pair only. AQ was very likely to be ahead but at the same time very vulnerable. Had the big stack turned over 6-7s for example then AQ becomes a mere 59% favourite to win. As it was Mr AQ would have been delighted to see 4-8o for the split second before the flop revealed 4-4-10. I was anticipating a tirade of colourful language before the miracle ‘runner-runner’ of King and Jack on the turn and river made a straight for AQ and saved the day.
For my own part I hung around in the tournament as a short stack simply by picking my moments against the wild, loose aggressor. Mediocre holdings such as A8 and Q10, the best I was seeing, had decent showdown value against a man playing any two cards. Then having crawled into the money positions my chance to compete for the big prizes was cruelly extinguished when a desperate late seat lunge of Q-6 toppled my awaiting A-K on the button. As always, going out on a bad beat is cruel, but in reality the alternatives are no better. Us poker players just don’t like losing!

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

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Asking for Trouble

June 22nd, 2009 by thepokergrafter

One source of valuable information that Sharkscope can give you about a tournament opponent you know little about is ‘average stake’. Often you will find that the player in question is indeed playing at a level he is accustomed to but it is extraordinary how often this isn’t the case. I have been struck recently about how often I have taken my place in a $109 SNG only to discover that several of my opponents at that level have an average stake of about $5. Further more, of those cavalier individuals who have suddenly taken a shot at a big money game, the vast majority will having been losing at the very lowest level. Quite simply, they are looking for one great game at high stakes to sort out their debts. To be frank these are good people to find yourself up against. They tend to be unaccomplished and now, thanks to a moment of madness, they are probably terrified.

These people are gamblers. I make a clear distinction between poker players and panicking, desperate gamblers. Poker players wager calculated sums with reason to believe they will see ROI -’return on investment’ in the long term. They have shown an ability to win some money over a period of time that has seen good and bad runs. I have previously suggested that a conservative estimate of what that time period would be is in the region of 1000 games or more. And trust me this is a conservative estimate. I know great online tournament players who have had a bad 1000 games. The swings are more brutal than 99% of online players could ever imagine.

For the gambler leaping up the stakes the phrase return on investment is an unnecessary compliment in itself. Throwing ten times more money at something you have previously been unsuccessful at isn’t investing in my eyes. Sharkscope should show their ROP – return on punt. When I go to the Epson Derby I’m not investing my money because I don’t know the first thing about horse racing. But I might take a punt, based on some ludicrous hunch involving a horse’s trainer being born on the same day as my uncle. In poker, you need to prove that you can win at the low levels in order to earn the right to play for big bucks. Put another way, get a bankroll!

The problem with this is that it can all take rather a lot of hard work, patience and can be rather time-consuming. Given that most losing ‘poker players’ – if I use the term in the loosest sense – are convinced that they are just unlucky, they can easily convince themselves that success is always just around the corner. (Most winning players are also convinced they are unlucky as well and that says a great deal.) Frighteningly, but also brilliantly from my point of view, a losing $5 player will often even conclude that their game is more suited to the high stakes. The rationale here would be that they operate on a level so high that their moves are wasted on other low stakes players. ‘A better player would have folded to my bluff there’, is not an uncommon thing to hear. So off they head to the high stakes where their brilliant play will finally be rewarded.

Delusional doesn’t even begin to cover this mentality. Yes, there is truth in the fact that a ‘move’ can sometimes work against a better player and not an imbecile but one of the game’s greatest skills is learning to play each opponent properly. ‘Don’t try to bluff a player who simply can’t fold‘, is a valuable lesson and one best to learn at lower stakes. These are the players who will pay you off when you really do have a hand. But putting all this to one side, the fact is that you’re probably not good enough to win at high stakes until you are a proven success lower down.
It is temptation that combines with this self-delusion when a player ends up in ‘too big’ a game. I’m sure that a player who has lost $250 playing $5 SNGs is discouraged by the thought that it will take a supremely good run at that level to merely return to even. He will then become intoxicated by the thought that just one good game at the $109 level will wipe out all the debt in an instance. Throw into the mix a sense of injustice having probably lost the previous game with AK against AQ and you have all the ingredients needed to make that rash decision to leap in at the deep end.

Of course, the most likely outcome of this decision is that that our loss chasing gambler will simply accelerate his demise into the red. Even the best tournament players on the internet don’t routinely make the money more than half the time in a standard format. Not over a year or two’s play at least. It is quite possible that the gambler will even play a faultless game. Indeed, I have noted that these stake leapers will often become very tight and put in a competent performance because so much is suddenly at stake. However, in a desperate bid to eradicate poor play they will often become too tight and weak. Suddenly their blinds are available for the taking and they become predictable. The regular high stake players have noted that the newcomer appears too scared to bluff or get out of line at all. Good players will inevitably use this to their advantage.

In the final analysis if the gambler falls short of the money at this level it will hurt more than ever. It won’t ultimately matter whether the crucial moment was determined by bad play or bad luck because the greatest pain will come from having needed a result far too much. Deep down, he will be angry with himself for entering a game that he had no business being in. But wait, perhaps he will make the money and it will all be ok. Possible. But I suspect that the bad decisions will not end there and it will all end in tears soon enough.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker.com

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Champagne Poker – The Squeeze Play

June 12th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

The squeeze play. Perhaps the most impressive and scintillating move in poker. It can only be attempted at rare moments when a series of circumstances combine to perfection and it can only be executed successfully with the mental fortitude to risk everything with very little. For every gem there will be half a dozen disastrous squeeze efforts that leave the perpetrator looking foolish. It is to Texas Holdem what the overhead kick is to football. Spectacular, high-risk and not to be attempted by the uninitiated.

The idea is that a player regarded as tight and conservative, identifies a loose aggressive player raising the pot in front of him and a similarly loose second player calling that raise before the action reaches our hero. At this point the ‘tight conservative’ player in late position puts in a massive re-raise with a mediocre hand to force everybody to fold and take down a decent pot without even seeing the flop. This is a standard squeeze scenario although it can also be attempted with multiple callers in front or from various seat positions, including the blinds. The move sounds simple in its description and yet the margin for error is miniscule. If any one of the factors is misjudged then the consequences are likely to be dire.

First of all ‘the squeezer’ must know that Player A, the initial raiser, is opening up pots with a wide range of start cards. Over a long period of play this should become apparent from either the sheer quantity of raises or from seeing the cards he shows down having played to a raise pre-flop. However, it is dangerous and far too easy to tag a player as loose aggressive just because he raises a few hands in a row. It’s vital to spot the difference between a card rush and generally more expansive play. A similar criteria must be used to assess the strength of Player B, the pre-flop caller in front. The additional information one has to work on here is that Player B opted to call, rather than re-raise Player A. This also implies weakness, particularly if we assume that Player B has also noticed the attacking intentions of Player A and has decided to see a few flops against him with marginal hands. The complexity of assessing what Player B thinks of Player A and assessing his tactics with this in mind is high-risk but essential for this move.

Having surmised that neither active player in the hand is strong, ‘the squeezer’ is now poised to make his play, but there are still more factors to consider. It’s far too simplistic to think ‘they’ve got nothing so they can’t call me.’ This is where table image comes in. It amazes me how often the player most likely to bluff at the table is the same player who most recently bluffed. A reputation as a bluffer will get good hands paid off but it won’t help future bluffs to succeed. For this reason the squeeze is suited to a player regarded as a rock, waiting for a big hand to make his move. If people don’t think you have the squeeze move in your playbook that’s ideal!

Infuriatingly, being a decent tight player with a good table image and the capability of making a great read still may not be enough though. Let’s say for instance that ‘the squeezer’ puts Players A and B on hands like Ace-rag suited and average high cards like Q-J. Let’s then say that his read is correct and that his opponents do indeed hold moderate start cards that have potential but can’t be played to a huge re-raise. The problem is that final assessment that they can’t be played. This would be the view of 95% of solid, experienced poker players but it may not mean that Player A or B will actually fold. Some players just can’t lay down a hand and this will certainly be the case if they suspect foul play. If the big intimidating raise looks like it doesn’t want a call then it is more than likely to get one from one of these ‘instinctive’ players, even with Q-J or A3s.
The temptation to call the squeeze will also be affected by stack size. A wild aggressive player with a monstrous pile of chips may feel that a loose call won’t really matter, so curiosity gets the better of them. A loose player who feels like he is on a roll is a dangerous commodity and virtually unbluffable. Similarly, a short stack is often inclined to think that there’s nothing left to lose so why not take a gamble. The squeeze must therefore be directed against players who do value their remaining chips and can lay down marginal cards.

The great thing about this manoeuvre is that it plays the opponents and the situation and is less card focused. It is based on an approximation of the cards that you think your opponents have and gives very little thought to what you hold yourself. Unfortunately, even a perfectly timed move can still be rumbled by a player left to act waking up with a beauty. But it really should have to be an exceptional hand to rumble you, given the play pattern up to this point. A wonderful illustration of this was a squeeze carried out by Dan Harrington at the 2004 WSOP. Renowned professional Harrington, carries the ironic nickname of ‘Action Dan’ due to his tight conservative reputation. He was therefore the perfect man to push the button with 6-2o against the loose aggressive players in front who had entered the play with K-9o and A-2s. This not only worked on them but the icing on the cake was that another player, still to act behind Harrington in the blinds, could not wait to throw away his AQ against such apparent strength. This illustrates how poker can be elevated from the solid and dependable to the stylish and great.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

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Quadruple Up

May 20th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

Recently I had the good fortune to quadruple up in a tournament after four similarly sized stacks moved all-in early on in a freezeout tournament. It got me thinking about how rarely this wonderful phenomenon has actually occurred in my favour, considering the thousands of hours I have played. Multi-way all-ins are commonplace in the frenetic madhouse that is a cheap rebuy tournament, typically in the first hour, but when losing an all-in actually means you’re out people tend to apply a little more discipline.

 

The hand that reaped my reward, funnily enough, was AA. I say this with some genuine surprise actually as although it is a strong start hand and a likely winner it is vulnerable in a multi-way pot and often easy to read and hard to get paid off with, if it does hold. This can be a particular difficulty when an ace comes on the flop with a couple of low inconsequential cards. Now I maybe hitting a new low of negative thinking to describe hitting ‘the nuts’ – the best possible hand at that point – as a problem. But the contrast between your brilliant hand and your opponents’ rags is unlikely to bring great reward. A rainbow flop (three different suits) of A-8-3 for example has virtually no scope for chasing a flush or straight or having flopped two pair. An opponent is even unlikely to have flopped a single pair with only one ace left in the pack after yours and no other high cards on the board.  Big pots are much better than big sets and they typically come about when two decent hands collide. The momentary joy at hitting top set is quickly tempered by the realisation that any bet will very likely end the hand for miniscule reward. The alternative of not betting the flop or turn to help your opponent catch something or induce a bluff is also flawed given that it’s easily read.

 

On this occasion my first break was being dealt AA. The second was hitting a further ace on the flop but crucially my further good fortune was a flop (Ac-Qh-7c) that had something for everyone. With three opponents having called my standard pre-flop raise from under-the-gun (first player to act) I was able to make a continuation bet with reason to hope I would get some action. All three players quickly called my bet which led to the jackpot card falling on the turn of the Queen of clubs. At this point all hell broke loose. I quickly realised that this gave me the nut full house while hopefully, surely, giving someone else a flush that they would assume was winning. What I hadn’t anticipated was that all four players left in the play would assume they were now winning. After the Qc fell the big blind checked to me again and I elected to continue my betting, just over half the pot-size, so not to draw attention to how strong I was. It was a play that I thought people would expect me to make with a hand such as AK or AJ that I might want to keep betting in spite of the danger cards. I felt that a sudden check-raise play would make it pretty obvious that I really did love my hand. However, given what followed, I would suggest that my efforts to slip under the radar were ultimately irrelevant because everybody had already decided to go all-in one way or another!

 

Following my continuation bet Player 2 simply called before Player 3 moved all-in. Player 4 soon followed his lead before the action returned to me. I was somewhat surprised by this and noted that I could of course be beaten by one hand – four queens. This was an unappetizing thought but only a brief consideration because I knew perfectly well that I wasn’t throwing away the nut full house because of the incredibly unlikely threat of four of a kind. If I was beat, I was beat. What I hadn’t expected was Player 1 to then plough in behind me for the remainder of his chips as well. You have to be pretty pleased with your holdings to call three all-ins in the early stages of a poker tournament!

 

As it turned out Player 1 was perhaps the unluckiest of the three losers, as he held the nut flush (Kc-9c). That said I would like to think I would have folded it after all that action, with at least one full house surely guaranteed. Had he moved all-in first then he would have been more unlucky. As it was he had at least the chance to make a great fold. Player 2 had been fishing and got what he deserved. Holding Qd-10d he was guilty of chasing on the flop with second pair and then when his apparent dream card arrived he failed to realise that it probably made someone else a flush. It was a classic case of somebody getting absorbed in the quality of their own hand – three-of-a-kind does sound good – and not paying attention to what else was going on around them and the danger that lurked. Player 3 also had a flush (5c-6c) and in fairness he did have Player 2 beat who was the only all-in he faced at the point his chips went in. That said, he had to consider the fact that a higher flush or any full house had him beat and there were still two players left to act behind him.

 

It was a dramatic moment that I was obviously delighted to come out of on top of. The funny thing was that one exciting moment led to the game getting very dull for a long period thereafter. The blinds were so low that the remaining players could take their time and not be intimidated by my big stack at all. To some extent I just had to wait for the phase of the game to arrive when I could make my chip advantage count. Only then did I really realise the benefit of that one crazy hand.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

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Justifying the Madness

April 28th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

Having stumbled into a rut of playing online all the time recently I ventured along to a nearby pub’s regular game yesterday just to get some face-to-face action back into my system. There’s not much call for a ‘game face’ in cyber world and I didn’t want to get too rusty. This was my first time in the cheap weekly pub tournament that, unsurprisingly, brings in a hardcore of regular players and a spattering of generally inexperienced newcomers. I was more than happy for several of the regulars to assume I was inexperienced just because they hadn’t seen my face before. Even better, after one particularly outrageous pot win I was dismissed as incompetent as well as a novice. Such is the power of table image that one or two players were still disbelieving when I was heads-up for the tournament several hours later.

The incident that would define my reputation for the evening occurred after half an hour of highly uneventful poker where I did very little other than establish what the blind structure was and fold a lot. The format offered an initial buy-in of 1500 chips, with an option of 2000 for a minimal additional fee. There would then be a free reload of 1500 chips for anybody busting out in the first hour, or as an add-on for everybody else. With the blinds guaranteed to soar later on and only 3 places paying out of 21 starters I realised that early chip accumulation was vital to compete. With that I mind I made my move.

The table play had been generally passive with ABC poker the order of the day. I soon felt that anybody getting out of line by becoming more aggressive and playing a wider range was liable to take a few pots cheaply or at least get themselves noticed. When I raised up behind a timid limper with 9-2o from a late seat I thought it might liven things up. This would prove to be an understatement. My raise was followed by a short-stack moving all-in and two further players, including the initial limper calling her bet. Suddenly the play was back on me with 2600 already in the pot and a further 450 chips required to see a guaranteed flop. I quickly checked my cards and still saw the miserable 9-2o staring back at me but felt that I now had value to call to see the ensuing board of 7-9-J. The three players in front of me all checked. I was last to act and had little hesitation in pushing my remaining 1100 chips into the middle. I had hit second pair, with an admittedly terrible kicker, but as flops went for this hand it looked reasonable. There was some chance I was actually ahead and I was likely to have a few outs if not. With such a big pot built up already I was fully, and unashamedly, committed to my trash hand. To my initial disappointment I was quickly called by J-10 before the other player with extra chips folded. The all-in hand held the equally scary Q-10. Moments later I spiked another 9 on the turn and the river drew a blank to rake in 5250 chips with a badbeat to the resounding horror of my rivals.

Now I was very lucky to win. That much can’t be denied. But interestingly for me most of the players at the table simply couldn’t fathom how this awful thing could have happened. I mean surely everybody knows –even an incompetent newcomer – that 9-2o is a bad hand that must be folded! For my part I made sure I looked suitably embarrassed and muttered something about ‘not knowing what I was doing.’ Defending myself by citing my poker CV would have been crass and foolish as it could have destroyed a table image that a half-decent player can only dream of. I had to keep up the hustle.

Firstly, you’ll be relieved to know that I am aware that 9-2o is a poor starting hand. I entered the pot in the interests of play variation with the key considerations that there was no obvious strength in the one hand limped behind me and that I held position. Furthermore, I felt the table was tight enough that I was quite likely to win the pot with a continuation bet on any flop. Crucially, once that initial gamble had been taken I believe my hand broadly ‘played itself’ in a way that thoughtful players should appreciate.

When the play returned to me pre-flop I had to call 450 chips to make it a pot of 3050. From a purely mathematical point-of-view this decision could be justified. Although the table had been quite meek by the standards of a cheap rebuy tournament I had no reason to assume that all three players had top premium hands. If I was up against three hands such as AK, AQ and 6-6 then I would have a 16% chance of winning with 2-9o. The pot odds afforded to me meant that I needed about a 15% chance of victory or better to make it a sound call. Even if I was up against better hands that took me below that 15% threshold I could probably argue my case for calling based on implied odds. Namely, had I made a miracle flop of two pair or better then it’s highly likely that I would have won considerably more from players who were bound to commit the rest of their stacks with strong holdings on a massive pot. Of course at the time I couldn’t know exactly what everybody else had, but in the event I was confronted in the showdown with nothing more than J-10 and Q-10, providing further vindication. Pre-flop, against those two hands alone, I would have had a 24% of winning.

I remain convinced that after the flop (J-9-7) my only move was all-in after the play was checked to me. Of course I wasn’t so naïve that I thought that checking equated to certain weakness but pushing 1100 chips into the 3050 chips already there made sense. If I was called by one opponent then I stood to win the pot of 5250 if successful. I could win this play one time in every five and it would still be a profitable move. As it happens I was in worse shape than I expected after being checked to. After hitting the flop I actually only had a 15% chance of winning against J-10 and Q-10. But I couldn’t have known that and I would argue that the mistake on the flop came from the opponent holding J-10 who flopped very well but didn’t bet, thus increasing the chance of an outdraw. This point is proven by the fact that had I checked the flop he would have lost anyway after the rogue 9 came on the turn.

My final defence would be that it was a rebuy tournament. I made my play knowing that I had more chips in reserve if things went wrong. That makes a big difference to tournament strategy. It can help justify calculated risks that when combined with good fortune can make you look like a lunatic.

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6-Seat Dilemmas-Part 2

April 16th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

I ended Part 1 of my look at 6-seat SNGs by suggesting that it becomes as easy to fold the best hand on the bubble as it is to end up all-in with trash. To explain how this can even be a problem for good, experienced players you need only think of what you would do with a few specific hands when down to the final three. Let’s assume again that the blinds are 150/300 but this time you have 2200 chips and wake up on the button with A-2o. Your opponents both have about 3400 chips so you are short-stacked but certainly not crippled.

What do I do with a rag ace?

With you holding an ace the chances of an opponent holding another ace, most likely with a better kicker, is only about 1 in 5. The chances of an opponent holding a pocket pair is about 1 in 17 so there is good reason to hope that your hand is winning pre-flop. With this in mind you might push all-in but if you do receive a call then you know immediately that you are in big trouble against a typical player’s range. Perhaps the best call you can hope for is from a hand like KQo, which is tough to fold on the big blind, short-handed, and against which you would be a 57% favourite.

But hang on, this doesn’t sound that good. Your best case scenario if you get called sees you still only a marginal favourite and most of time a call will find you to be an underdog. Basically you’re desperate to force two folds and take the blinds and have very little reason to be confident about a showdown. Well that’s more or less what you would be thinking if you held 7-2o as well! This can make you think one of two ways depending on whether you are a ‘glass half-full’ or ‘glass half-empty’ type of player. An optimistic, aggressive player might conclude that the chances of either opponent having a hand to genuinely fear is slim enough that he might as well push all-in with a wide range of start cards – almost anything. With this mentality it becomes easy to comprehend how a player suddenly finds his tournament future on the line with trash. When that happens a few times in a row it’s not uncommon for the aggressor to rein in his rash tendencies and determine to never go out with a bad hand again. Suddenly the chastened bubble player goes into his shell and folds A-2o on the button because he would be annoyed to go out without a genuinely big hand. The fact that it may well in fact be the best hand at this point is just an annoyance. This is the ultimate tournament dilemma and it has no easy answers. But there is, of course, another play option that I haven’t mentioned today, and it is a crucial one.

So can I still get away with raising and how much?

As I alluded to in Part 1 this is another delicate option because of the general air of suspicion that surrounds most tournament tables. A raise when the blinds are worth winning will always carry the whiff of stealing with it and this must be factored in. Suddenly, the chip stack sizes and the tendencies of your rivals are far more important in determining tactics than the cards themselves. This is the essence of competitive poker; to play the opponent and the situation, not just the cards.

With some players I know that if I raise the minimum amount on the bubble of a 6-seat tournament they will always call in the big blind and they have good odds to do so. I also know that if I raise 3-times the big blind with such a shallow stack then I’m probably committing to the pot, whether I like to or not. In the example above it is very hard to justify raising 900 chips out of my 2200 only to give up to a re-raise, or without betting a flop. I can’t waste 41% of my chips like that and end up with 1300 chips. However, if I had just a few more chips then I would consider a steal raise and it would be in-between the minimum and the ‘standard’ in size.

Does raising 2.5 times the big blind really help?

I genuinely believe that the ‘2.5 raise’ eg 750 when the blinds are 150/300 is a secret weapon that isn’t utilised effectively by many SNG players. As with so many good tactics, if you find it is difficult to play against then it’s probably something to consider adding to your own playbook. As crazy as it may sound many players will become reticent about calling on their big blind for a further 450 chips when seemingly they wouldn’t think twice about it for 300. Therefore, that can mean more pots won uncontested. Secondly, the ‘2.5 raise’ looks like a carefully sized bet that you might throw in with a premium hand, thus causing trepidation. Conversely, when it becomes clear that the ‘2.5’ has become your standard raise it will provide excellent disguise when you do pick up a monster. This can work spectacularly well against an opponent who gets frustrated by calling and then folding the flop who instead attempts to put you in your place pre-flop with a re-raise all-in bluff.

Admittedly raise sizing is about personal preference and many good players would play down the significance I have given to ‘2.5 betting’. But in small SNGs fine margins can make huge differences in the long term. For example, thousands of games of experience suggest to me that the difference between having 1300 chips when the blinds are 150/300 or having 1850 is significant. Therefore, raising 900 chips to steal from an initial 2200 feels like a mistake and yet raising 750 chips from a stack of 2600 feels acceptable. There’s a telling difference to me between risking 29% of my chips on a bubble steal in the latter case as opposed to 41% in the former. Once you take away the maths, it’s a game of opinions.

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6-Seat Dilemmas-Part 1

April 7th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

In a six-seated single-table tournament it is commonplace for only two places to pay out. Technically, the odds of making the money are favourable in comparison to the standard 10-seat format where the top three take a prize. In the six-seater, 33% of the starting field will make money as opposed to 30% in the full table version. Yet many SNG regulars still shy away from the table of six where play inevitably gets short-handed much sooner and the need for aggression is paramount. When fortune is running against you making the top two seems a tough ask even with fewer runners to overcome. A typical scenario I face on a near-daily basis is to find myself one of three finely balanced remaining stacks with about 3000 chips each and the blinds at 150/300. This is the time when you must hold your own to survive and accumulate chips to prosper. Although every game has its own unique dynamic, the same old questions and dilemmas will keep arising and there’s no excuse for not being ready with a few answers.

 

If I don’t get any good cards at this crucial phase of the game what can I do?

 

Steal. It’s imperative. When the blinds are eating away at your stack on two out of every three hands becoming tight and weak is disastrous. If you wait too long to make that move even an eventual double-up may not put you back in a strong position. Your problems will be compounded by the fact that observant, aggressive opponents will identify weakness and target you for their own stealing. A timid strategy may get you a decent number of second places after the other two players clash but this is no good to you. The pay structure is always skewed dramatically in favour of the winner so a series of 2nds and 3rds is futile in the pursuit of decent long-term profit.

 

If I do get a big hand, how do I get paid off?

 

Note that if you’ve been a folding machine for any length of time then a sudden raise is likely to be respected. This sounds great (we all want respect) but, of course, it is not. You get a big hand – at last – you raise, they fold. That’s hopeless. And the problem isn’t really the raise. A flat call from the button seat, and possibly the small blind, may also put your opponents on high alert. After showing weakness you really need to get very lucky and not only pick up a big hand but ideally while sitting in the big blind. At least there you are last to act pre-flop and you may be targeted by aggressive opponents. But this is a lot to ask; not only to get a strong hand at the right moment but also in the one seat that favours your table image. A much better bet is to be stealing pots and playing quite loose aggressively as soon as the blinds are significant and the play is short-handed. That way the really big hand is much harder to spot and you might get the action you crave.

 

How hard should I defend my big blind?

 

Once again table image and a strong read on your opponents is crucial. If you are being raised at every opportunity from either the button or the small blind then you must make a stand at some point. If your opponents are pushing all-in with what you perceive as a very wide range then you have to adjust your calling range accordingly. A hand such as A-4 can be very strong against all-out aggression; a player who believes that fold equity makes pushing any two cards a gamble worth taking.

Against a barrage of constant raising (but not all-ins) the big blind considerations are slightly different. In this case the all-in re-raise may often claim the pot without need for a showdown. That’s rarely anything but a great result in short-handed bubble play. Not only do you win a decent pot without the threat of elimination that comes when your cards are on their back, but your table image is enhanced as an aggressor. Another alternative is peeling off the flop.

 

Can I outplay my opponents off the flop and how many flops will they let me see?

 

At least when you get raised a small or standard amount on your big blind there is normally an opportunity to see three more cards. Some players will have competent pre-flop pushing and calling ranges but go to pieces when the flop comes into play. They know enough to identify a good start hand but may lack the requisite finesse when the board makes things more complicated. You want to take these players out of their comfort zone. A check raise all-in when you hit the flop well can be a valuable tool from the big blind. The same play can be equally potent when you’re convinced your opponent has missed the board and almost certainly can’t call the all-in. A classic example of this is the loose aggressor who fires hard at a board like A-A-9 when all previous evidence suggests that he only checks the flops he likes the most. Good players should want to see a decent number of flops when play is short-handed. The problem with that is that many opponents simply won’t allow it. Any limp from the button or small blind results in an immediate shove all-in. Inevitably this in turn opens the door for trapping with big hands.

 

So there is still much more to consider regarding short-handed play. Next week I’ll look at the dichotomy that exists where it becomes as easy to fold the best pre-flop hand as it is to risk everything with the worst.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

 

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Raising the Bar

March 25th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

How big to make your raise is a question that tends to get surprisingly little thought. A standard raise is typically regarded as three times the big blind and I think many players religiously follow this pattern simply because everybody else does it. A player dealt AQ in a late seat will think nothing of opening up the pot with the ‘3 times’ raise because he has decent start cards, position, but nothing to get really excited by. The same player may quickly develop the habit of raising 3x with most pocket pairs and other strong aces in a late seat. He knows that if he gets some action he his quite likely to flop nicely or take the pot regardless with one further bet. Equally, he realises that this standard pre-flop ‘3 times’ raise will quite often take the pot uncontested without even seeing a board. This is also ok but can get frustrating when the blinds are pitifully small and the pot is next to worthless. But at least with a hand like AQ he knows he hasn’t wasted something special. But the dilemma soon comes when AA arrives, the table is tight and he figures that a standard raise will most likely reap nothing more than the meaningless blinds again. Now that does feel like a waste so he considers the minimum raise of 2 times the big blind.

 

The rationale is that by making the raise smaller he is more likely to induce an opponent into seeing the flop. The reality can be very much the opposite. The problem is that after a string of standard raises a suddenly change of tact looks like it’s crying out for a call -which it is. Against a tight player the implication of immense strength will probably ensure a fold even faster than usual. Suffice to say, making a premium hand apparent to all around you is not a tactically astute play. An alert player, even with a good hand of his own will apply a higher level of caution because of the information given out. This makes it very difficult to get a big hand paid off. Worse still, a smart player may still call your pre-flop and know that a great flop for him will take all your chips.

 

A case in point came two days ago in a tournament I was in when a loose player who had standard raised consistently suddenly took a little longer to consider his options before minimum raising. He had already demonstrated himself to be a novice by the way he conducted himself. The comment after ten minutes that he had only had one really decent hand ‘all game’ is a textbook example of a newcomer who can be surprised and impatient about the fact that good hands don’t come every two minutes. All he was really saying was that he hadn’t begun the tournament with a wondrous card rush. Poor guy. Nice of him to share that with us though. The revelation that the one really good hand had been K-J suited had me champing at the bit. This was a guy who had in fact already won a big pot with 2-2 after hitting a set. The fact that he didn’t identify this as a big hand but did like K-Js showed that he was some combination of forgetful, delusional and/or impatient. The exact measures of this particular cocktail were as yet unknown but I knew I liked it.

 

Of course when a guy like this does get dealt AA it is a sight to behold. His reaction speed is immediately hampered as the full significance of the moment sinks in. He realised that this was THE big moment and whatever happened he couldn’t waste it by scaring everyone away pre-flop. That would be unforgivable, so after much deliberation he minimum raised. I’m sure everybody already knew what he had from that moment. I knew, the other players knew, I dare say even the cat in the corner of the room knew. Most people folded but I decided to put in the other 50 chips to call on the big blind to see if I could flop something special with 7-9s. The flop came 7-9-Q and I knew that I had him. I bet, he waited…and waited, then raised. I moved all-in. He waited and waited…and waited. By then I was positive that he had AA and I knew there was no way this guy was folding.

 

He was showboating. He wasn’t taking his time to consider his options or indeed what I might have. In the moronic world of his mind he had the best possible hand and I was too stupid to realise it. I was being ‘slowrolled’ by the guy with the worst hand. Ridiculous. I would have felt sorry for him if slowrolling to wind up your opponents wasn’t just pure gamesmanship. That and the realisation that while ahead I could still lose. My mood shifted quickly from pity to annoyance and apprehension. Sure enough he eventually flicked over his nuggets with the cocky air of somebody who hadn’t even considered my hand. Perhaps instead of two playing cards he assumed I would be holding a rattle and an engraved trophy proclaiming my opponent as ‘simply the best.’ Instead I had the best hand. That was until he spiked a queen on the river to claim what I’m sure he regarded as justice. He might as well have played with his cards face up and he still knocked me out! Never mind, I’m not that bitter. I did all I could by getting the chips in when I was a 75% favourite. Sometimes that just isn’t enough.

 

Most of the time it’s a good idea to avoid your opponents when their hands are strong for pretty obvious reasons. But when you have a great read and know what they have then it becomes possible to turn this strength against them. The best possible two card combination is often just a solitary pair after the flop and imminently beatable. The great news is that a novice, particularly a deluded one, will often still think he holds the nuts. This is where poker gets interesting. 

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Bubble Maniacs

February 6th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

The basic mantra of single table tournament strategy is play tight early on and become increasingly aggressive as the blinds go up. Accelerating your play on ‘the bubble’ is widely regarded as essential to stop your stack dwindling as the blinds arrive more frequently in short-handed play. The other reason why attack is seen as the best form of defence is that some opponents may get tighter and weaker as the threat of elimination just shy of the money looms large. Consequently the aggression is more likely to succeed against such timidity. Now this is all well and good but surely there is a limit to how far the attack should go? I believe that there’s such a thing as pushing your luck. I also like to think that bubble aggression should be distinguished from moving all-in on every hand in the belief that everyone will be too scared to call you without a premium hand. For the maniac, bubble aggression is just a license to tilt.

First of all let me re-iterate why bubble aggression does work in general terms. A notion called the ‘gap concept’ was derived by celebrated poker author David Sklansky. The principle is actually quite straightforward; a player needs a better hand to call a raise with than to open the pot themselves. The difference between the hand needed to raise with and the hand needed to call with represented ‘the gap’. In tournament bubble strategy an all-in bet with any two cards might prove successful because of fold equity. The strength of the play is enhanced not by the quality of the start cards but rather by the degree of possibility that your opponent will feel forced to fold. Your opponent has no fold equity. He can only win the hand courtesy of a showdown. Most players will be keen to avoid pivotal showdowns without what they estimate to be a considerable edge, not least on the bubble. For this basic reason bubble aggression succeeds as it frequently forces the better hand to fold.

The infuriating thing is that some players have heard about the cocktail of bubble aggression, fold equity and the gap concept and concluded that all-in every time is probably the optimum strategy. The annoying thing about this simplistic, frankly lazy approach is that it works pretty well. It is a nightmare to play against because it significantly reduces your own opportunities to be the aggressor yourself. It grates for the further reason that you frequently see the bubble bully get ‘caught out’ throwing his chips all-in w J-3 only to crush A-K anyway. And what can be more annoying than knowing your opponent is playing ‘any two’ on your big blind and you can never get higher than 8-high to call with.

The flip side of this is that the bubble bullies will throw away golden positions more often than anybody who is capable of reigning in their maniacal tendencies. The all-in play seems to become addictive and these guys often seem oblivious to the fact that their fold equity can go out the window pretty quickly. The most likely cause of this is when the bubble period of the game suddenly ends and everybody left is guaranteed a prize. Suddenly the remaining contenders are queuing up to call the all-ins with anything from queen high to double up and teach him a lesson. It’s easier to be brave at this point and Q-9 can look like a monster against ‘any two’. But even during the bubble phase those of us playing to win will not shy away from calling for our tournament lives with ace-rag. The eternal hope of a bubble maniac that he will only be called by a premium hand is wishful thinking against those who extend their calling range accordingly.

It’s a fine line between aggression and tilt at the climax of a SNG. While the maniac can go too far with his approach he will certainly be more profitable than the rock who meekly surrenders while waiting for big hands to play. That said, he will make less money in the long term than the master who applies controlled aggression with awareness of the constantly changing game dynamic. An alternative that needs examining in closer detail is the tactic of replacing the frequent all-in with the stealth steal raises. This has the benefit of allowing you to fold if you do run into a big hand. The problem of that is when have you really run into a big hand? Or have your measured raises simply opened the door for the re-steal bluffs? I’ll open this alternative can of worms on another occasion. But one thing’s for sure; there’s more to bubble strategy than meets the eye.

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The Unknown Quantity

January 26th, 2009 by thepokergrafter

When you don’t know a thing about your opponent I think it is always best to assume a reasonable level of competence on their part. Better to wait for mistakes to undermine that status rather than under-estimating an unknown quantity. It’s the best way to keep your own play up to scratch. Assuming everybody else is rubbish seems to me a fast track to losing money and the sort of wishful thinking that could find yourself disregarded by others. ‘I put you on ace-king,’ is the sort of fanciful statement that fish come out with to justify calling off all their chips with bottom pair on a low flop. Don’t get me wrong; there are times when I too ‘put a player on ace-king’ having watched them play for a while, but why would I do so on the first significant play of theirs I have ever seen? The simple answer is wishful thinking. A bad player who hates to fold any flop that they have connected with in some way tries to find a hand that their opponent could hold to justify a dubious call of their own. Ace-king often fits the bill.

The other side of the coin is that I will sometimes fold the best hand having given my opponent credit where it is not due. This is a wretched feeling and of course feels like a mistake but it won’t necessarily be so. Sometimes you can only justify making a call against the loosest, wildest player at the table. But you have to know that he is that first! Furthermore, if you are involved in a hand against two unknown quantities you have to proceed with even more caution. It’s dangerous to assume that one player is a loose cannon, let alone two. That’s just irrational. That said, a hand unfolded the other day that infuriated me because sound logic led to me folding the best hand after the river and I would have tripled up. If only I had put everybody on A-K and hoped for the best…

To set the scene, I was playing in a multi-table freezeout tournament when after a lull of activity I woke up with A-A under-the-gun, meaning I was first to act pre-flop. I raised the pot to four times the big blind and given my recent inactivity and my position this should have looked strong to any keen observers. To explain this further, a raise from early position will generally represent strength because it is a high-risk play to try and bluff everybody with a whole table left to act. Who knows what you could run into. Somebody raising to steal the blinds is therefore much more likely to do so from middle-to-late position. There was no reason to assume that my raise wasn’t bonafide and therefore one might assume that most players would only call me with strong holdings of their own. But ‘most players’ aren’t ‘all players’ and herein lay the start of my problems. Two players called me in middle positions and I had never seen either one of them play a significant hand before.

My next complication was to be the board after the flop came K-Q-3 and I bet strongly and both players called quickly. Experience has led me to be very wary in this scenario. Let’s just say that I wasn’t chuckling to myself about how much money I was about to win with my overpair. Instead, I was already concerned that one or both players had K-Q or a set. Then a jack turn card made my heart sink still further. Let me explain my rationale at this point. I was now losing if either player held K-Q, K-J, Q-J, K-K, Q-Q, J-J, 3-3 or A-10. Admittedly, a couple of these hands seemed unlikely but there were just so many, and what else could they be calling with? Any lower pairs would surely have been folded on the flop and the list of realistic hands where I was still winning with A-A seemed short and unlikely. Maybe they could both have A-K or A-Q? Wishful thinking surely.

The river card brought a five that didn’t seem too threatening but since I assumed the damage was already done this offered scant consolation. I checked my hand and desperately hoped my two opponents would do likewise or at least bet light. No such luck. An all-in bet from one was swiftly followed by an all-in call from player two. The pot was now massive but I just couldn’t see how I could call with my own tournament life at stake. Had I believed that I would win here even 1 in 3 times I might well have called, given the value and size of the pot. Of course I folded and what I saw was somewhat sole-destroying.

Opponent 1 had J-10, or third pair with an average kicker. He had called the pre-flop raise quite loosely, then unsurprisingly followed his straight draw on the flop. He picked up a pair on the turn giving him more outs before effectively bluffing all-in at the end having seen my weakness. I would say this move was still optimistic considering the third party in the hand. And so it proved as opponent 2 claimed the glory with K-9. In other words my solitary overpair would have triumphed over both. But could I realistically have assumed that this guy was taking on my big pre-flop under-the-gun raise with K-9? He was certainly never folding once he hit top pair and kicker concerns clearly never entered his mind.

It was an interesting example of how hazardous it can be to be confronted by two dubious aggressive players in one hand. Had Player 1 checked at the end with J-10, given that he had some showdown value, it may well have been a different story. Player 2 with K-9 might well have checked out as well, thus handing me victory. Equally, had I only been confronted by one all-in it would have much more conceivable to call. I console myself with the conviction that 9 times out of 10 it would have been a good fold given the information I had to work with. It’s not good to become a guy who can never lay down aces anyway. That said, I could have done with all those chips.

Simon Ballou writes for Oddschecker Poker

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